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A woman is entitled to reasonable, tranquil living conditions, that
will allow her to live her life and carry on her occupation, whether
at home or outside, and to raise her children. It may be that
emotional abuse is harsher than physical abuse, depending on the
circumstances and the nature of the 'intrusion' into the life of the
other. The guiding principles are these: 'she was given [to her
husband] to live with, but not to suffer pain,' and 'no one can live
with a serpent in the same basket' - the court must therefore
[Vol. 32:1
Changing the Current Policy Towards Spousal Abuse
consider each case, depending on the circumstances, and decide
according to and in light of these principles.
Abuse in general and of a spouse in particular, is a scourge that
the legal system should uproot. When abuse takes place in the
context of an ongoing, intimate relationship, it can embitter the
victim's life. Sometimes this is as true for verbal violence and
emotional abuse as it is for physical or sexual violence. It is often
extremely difficult to detect or prove emotional abuse because, unlike
physical abuse, it is invisible and leaves no perceptible marks. But
"many words hurt more than swords," and verbally abusive behavior,
particularly when ongoing, may be just as painful as physical or sexual
assault, or even more so (and sometimes these behaviors occur
together). However, the general community, much less the legal
community, does not always comprehend that emotional abuse can be
severe and should merit appropriate legal treatment and response.
However, modern law does not address emotional abuse to the same
extent and with the same level of determination with which it
attempts (at least in theory) to deal with other types of violence,
physical and sexual. Indeed, we will see that these too are not dealt
with sufficiently by the modern law.
In this paper, we will examine two models that relate differently
to the issue of spousal abuse (physical, sexual, and emotional) -
modern secular common law and religious Jewish law. The modern
secular model will be represented by two legal systems - the
American and the Israeli - two common law systems, which share
certain characteristics and underlying bases.2 In analyzing those legal
systems (in the following chapters I-IlI), the paper examines not only the
gap between modem secular American law and religious Jewish law, but
also that between the secular law of the modem democratic State of Israel
and ancient Jewish law.
The two models, secular common law and religious Jewish law,
offer similar (although not identical) legal solutions to the problem in
certain cases, but their overall approach to the issues are different.
American and Israeli law attempt to addresses the various types of
abuse, but the approaches taken are inconsistent and insufficient.
The Jewish law model tackles the issue of abuse more
comprehensively, but it needs to be adapted somewhat to serve as the
1. Justice Menachem Elon in CA 458/79 Nir v. Nir [1980] IsrSC 35(1) 520, 527.
2. Admittedly, American law is comprised of both federal and state law, while
this distinction is lacking in Israeli law.
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basis for a proposed model to improve the current situation in
modern law. At the end of this essay (chapter IV) we will offer our own
model, appropriate for American and Israeli law, which attempts to
draw on the advantages of the existing models and improve upon them.
Spousal abuse within the family is addressed in the legal
framework in three main spheres: civil law, criminal law, and family
law. Generally speaking, we may say that, to deal with the myriad
forms of domestic violence, the three branches of the law have joined
forces and have created various instruments in an attempt to
eradicate this terrible phenomenon. Criminal law has contributed
modes of punishment, civil law has provided methods of protecting
battered family members (protective orders), and family-divorce law
has recognized spousal abuse as grounds for divorce. Modern tort
law does not include a specific tort of physical, sexual or emotional
abuse, whether in the family framework or in general. However, this
does not mean that a tort claim by one spouse against the other, as a
result of such abuse, may not be entertained. In fact, tort law
contributes, particularly when the damage done to the spouse
(generally the wife) is non-pecuniary damage (e.g., pain and
emotional suffering, fear, shame, social isolation, depression, and
damage to self-esteem).
While the situation is not encouraging in terms of tort claims for
spousal abuse, this path is not completely blocked. In criminal law,
however, the situation is even more problematic. The offense of
physical, sexual, or emotional abuse against a spouse does not exist in
many countries of the world, or even in many states in the United
States.3 That being the case, such behavior could lead to the criminal
courts only if it can be classed as one of the other offenses recognized
under penal law. Whereas physical and sexual abuse had made their
way into the existing penal framework, the same can not be said for
emotional abuse.
The position is similar in family law. Instances of physical
violence always serve as a possible basis for protective orders against
a spouse (usually in the form of restraining orders). Sexual violence
serves as grounds for such orders only in certain American states4 (it
does serve as grounds in Israel),' while emotional abuse serves as
3. See infra parts IIA 2 & 3.
4. See infra part IIC1.
5. See infra part 11C2.
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grounds for such orders only in a small number of American states,6
and in some of these, the emotional abuse has to be deemed severe.
In Israel, emotional abuse is included in current legislation, but the
approach is not at the same level as that for physical and sexual
abuse.7
All of the above paints a rather grim picture, in which modem law
deals with the various forms of abuse only partially, and unsatisfactorily.
Here, American law and Israeli law are quite similar. The law does not
recognize a specific offense or tort of spousal abuse. In family law, the
treatment is somewhat better, but, with respect to emotional abuse, the
situation is still far from satisfactory. In general, we may say that modem
law differentiates (at least theoretically) between physical and sexual
abuse on the one hand, and emotional abuse on the other, and favors the
former.
In contrast, Jewish law took a uniquely different approach,
placing equal emphasis on physical and emotional abuse, which is
unfortunately so characteristic of relations between spouses. First,
Jewish law proclaimed the obligation of spouses to treat each other
with respect.8 This obligation, to treat a spouse with respect is
significant, and is unlike the situation in modern law in which lack of
respect for a spouse is not expressly forbidden. Second, the Jewish
sages took a grave view of acts of spousal abuse, and held that such
acts justify an aggressive legal policy, fundamentally different from
that applicable in ordinary instances of non-spousal abuse.9 This
recognizes the special relationship between husband and wife, and
thus the intensity of the damage when we consider the wife of the
abuser, "who lives with him in peace and her tears are near."1 The
central rationale is that spouses whose relationship involves abuse
cannot continue to live together, and thus the law needs to intervene,
since "no one can live with a serpent in the same basket."'1 Another
basis is an interpretation of the verse dealing with Eve, the progenitor
of the human race, "because she was the mother of all living"12: "she
was given [to her husband] to live but not to suffer pain." 3 Most of
6. See infra part IIC1.
7. See infra part 11C2.
8. See text following near note 223.
9. See text following near note 243.
10. OrZarua, Bava Kama, 161.
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the Jewish law sources address the case of physical abuse, and then
they derive, by analogy, similar rules in regard to emotional abuse.
This is particularly so regarding civil-tort law and abuse as grounds
for divorce. Jewish law also made use, quite successfully, of the
social-criminal sanctions of excommunication and ostracism against a
husband who beat his wife or emotionally abused her. This penalty
was, and to a certain extent still is, extremely effective, and was
imposed on the abuser along with a series of additional sanctions,
such as monetary fines, imprisonment, corporal punishment, and
others.
Jewish law might offer a better model for dealing with spousal
abuse, subject to revising it to accord with modern law. Greater
attention to emotional abuse, treating it on the same level as physical
or sexual abuse, and the development of particular, specific
arrangements for the offense and tort of spousal abuse, are all
necessary steps. The arrangement in Jewish law, which equates
emotional abuse to physical abuse, is the most complete. What is now
needed is legislative intervention, the establishment of a particular
offense of spousal abuse within the penal law, and of a specific tort of
spousal abuse (with consideration for the possibility of awarding
aggravated or punitive damages for such a tort, due to its nature),
along with relaxing the tests for awarding protection orders for
emotional abuse under civil-family law.
II. Spousal Abuse in Common Law: USA and Israel
A. Spousal Abuse in Common Tort Law
In this chapter we will discuss the approach of common tort law to
spousal abuse. First we will look at traditional common law in the
United States and Israel, and then the modern law of those countries.
These legal systems do not recognize spousal abuse as independent
grounds for tort claims. Rather, they choose other, more general,
arrangements to deal with it; this indicates that the legal treatment of
the problem is incomplete. Among other things, there is a significant
lack of consistency in the way different states in the United States deal
with the problem, and inconsistency in regard to the different types of
abuse even within the same jurisdiction.
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1. Spousal Abuse Tort Claims in Traditional Common Law
At common law, a doctrine of immunity in intra-familial
relations has prevailed, meaning that the possibility of a child suing a
parent and one spouse suing the other was totally blocked. In English
law the rationale for spousal immunity was the view of the husband
and the wife as a unified entity in virtue of the marriage, and a person
cannot commit a tort against himself.1 4 This view derives from the
verse: "For this reason a man will leave his father and mother and be
united to his wife, and they will become one flesh." 5 According to
traditional common law, tort claims might seriously harm family
harmony, and therefore it disallowed any kind of intra-familial tort
claim. Familial immunity under English law was almost fully cancelled
in 1962.16 Nevertheless, English law preserved a vestige of that
immunity, by enabling courts to stay proceedings in spousal tort claims
to preserving family harmony and preventing its collapse.'7
Israeli law (specifically §18(a) of the Civil Wrongs Ordinance), 8
which is based on English law, also provided immunity in suits between
spouses (but not against parents). This reflects an unwillingness to apply
the principles of private law to spousal relations, which would allow
sweeping intervention in the family unit. The clause stated: "No claim
shall be entered by a spouse or the representative of their estate against
a spouse or the representative of their estate in respect of a tort done
prior to their marriage or as long as their marriage is in force." '9 The
origin of this section is in §9(1) of the Civil Wrongs Ordinance, 1944,
which was in force under the British Mandate. This section was
criticized by the Supreme Court because blocking any tort lawsuit
against a spouse, under any given circumstance, seemed unjustified."
Ultimately, the immunity was repealed in Israel in 1969, with the passage
14. Glanville Williams, The Legal Unity of Husband and Wife, 10 MOD. L. REV.
16 (1947).
15. Genesis 2:24.
16. Law Reform (Husband and Wife) Act, 1962, c. 48.
17. Id.
18. Civil Wrongs Ordinance (New Version), 5732-1972, 2 LSI 12 (1972) (Isr.)
[hereinafter Civil Wrongs Ordinance].
19. Id.
20. See, e.g., CA 257/57 Barnett v. Barnett [1958] srSC 12 565; CA 479/60
Appelstein v. Aharoni [1961] IsrSC 15(1) 682. For a survey of the differences in
interpretation between Jewish and English law, see MENACHEM ELON, THE STATUS
OF WOMEN 217ff (2005) [hereinafter Elon].
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of the Litigation between Spouses (Regulation) Law.2' Like English law,
this law enables the courts to invoke a stay of proceedings.22 However,
no such stay has ever been invoked in suits between spouses.
In traditional American law the same rationale can be seen.
Family tranquility and harmony were major values that overrode the
spouse's or child's rights to sue. However, the immunity for spouses
was not complete. Finally, there was a full parent-child immunity
doctrine that was partially cancelled in most U.S. jurisdictions during
the twentieth century. 3
2. Spousal Abuse Tort Claims in American Law
Nowadays in the United States more courts are allowing spouses
to sue one another for different kinds of abuse and claims for physical
injury are already generally actionable.4 Most states recognize claims
for physical battery, including both negligent and intentional
infliction of physical injury.25 The only thing that would stand in the
way of such a claim would be any lingering application of the spousal
immunity doctrine, which has not been fully abrogated in all states.26
In addition, there is no specific tort of spousal abuse. Spouses who
are abused either physically, sexually, or emotionally, must sue under
the same tort claims that everyone else uses, such as assault, battery,
slander, and intentional infliction of emotional distress ("IIED").
Not surprisingly there is not a unified approach in the different
21. Litigation between Spouses (Regulation) Law, 5729-1969, S. H. 5729, 151
(Isr.). Section 3 of this law repealed section 18(a) of the Civil Wrongs Ordinance.
22. Id.§1.
23. DAN B. DOBBS & PAUL T. HAYDEN, TORTS AND COMPENSATION 441- 46 (5th
ed. 2001); GEORGE C, CHRISTIE, JAMES E. MEEKS, ELLEN S. PRYOIR & JOSEPH
SANDERS, CASES AND MATERIALS ON THE LAW OF TORTS, 543-45 (4th ed. 2004)
[hereinafter CHRISTIE ET AL.]; JOHN L. DIAMOND, CASES AND MATERIALS ON TORTS,
449 (2001); RICHARD A, EPSTEIN, TORTS, 613-14 (1999); FRANK J. VANDALL ET AL.,
TORTS: CASES AND PROBLEMS, 668-88 (2d ed. 2003); Steven G. Neeley, The
Psychological and Emotional Abuse of Children: Suing Parents in Tort for the
Infliction of Emotional Distress, 27 N. KY. L. REV. 689 (2000); Sandra L. Haley, The
Parental Tort Immunity Doctrine: Is it a Defensible Defense?, 30 U. RICH L. REV.
575 (1996); Ira Mark Ellman & Stephen D. Sugarman, Spousal EmotionalAbuse as a
Tort.?, 55 MD. L. REV. 1268 (1996) [hereinafter Ellman & Sugarman].
24. Ellman & Sugarman, supra note 23, at 1275.
25. Id. at 1282-83.
26. Id. at 1282; CHRISTIE ET AL,, supra note 23, at 543-45. For a summary of
which states have not fully abrogated the doctrine see LEONARD KARP, DOMESTIC
TORTS: FAMILY VIOLENCE, CONFLICT, AND SEXUAL ABUSE 683-86 (vol. II, rev. ed.
2005).
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U.S. jurisdictions. In some states, the spousal immunity doctrine is
abrogated only when certain conditions are met whereas for non-
spousal relations, there are no such restrictions. Every state has its
own rules. The conditions for abrogation of the immunity include:
intentional torts27 or for extreme intentional torts only; when
sufficient separation or extremely violent acts show a lack of marital
harmony; 21 when the spouses are judicially separated so no harmony
exists;' or for personal injury actions or vehicular torts only.31
Maybe the most problematic tort claim against a spouse is a
claim for IIED.32 The tort claim in cases of IIED is summarized by
the Restatement (Second) of Torts. Section 46 of the Restatement,
titled "Outrageous Conduct Causing Severe Emotional Distress,"
states:
(1) One who by extreme and outrageous conduct intentionally or
recklessly causes severe emotional distress to another is subject
to liability for such emotional distress, and if bodily harm to the
other results from it, for such bodily harm.
(2) Where such conduct is directed at a third person, the actor is
subject to liability if he intentionally or recklessly causes severe
emotional distress
27. In Utah the immunity is abrogated only for intentional torts. See Stoker v.
Stoker, 616 P.2d 590 (1980). In Idaho the immunity is abrogated only for intentional
torts and vehicular torts. See Lorang v. Hays, 209 P.2d 733 (1949); Rogers v.
Yellowstone Park Co., 539 P.2d 566 (1975).
28. In Florida, the immunity was abrogated only for extreme intentional torts and
where spouse dies between alleged wrongful conduct and commencement of suit,
where the claim is limited to the amount of insurance. See Waite v. Waite, 618 So. 2d
1360 (1988); Sturiano v. Brooks, 523 So. 2d 1126 (1993).
29. That is the situation in Georgia. See Harris v. Harris, 313 S.E.2d 88 (1984);
Smith v. Rowell, 335 S.E.2d 461 (1985). See also Jones v. Jones, 376 S.E.2d 674
(1989) (determining that there is no inter-spousal immunity from wrongful death
actions).
30. In Louisiana the immunity was never fully abrogated, but interspousal torts
are allowed when spouses are judicially separated. See La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 9:291.
31. In Iowa the immunity was abrogated for personal injury actions. See Shook
v. Crabb, 281 N.W.2d 616 (1979). In Nevada and Vermont it was abrogated for
vehicular torts only. See Rupert v. Stienne, 528 P.2d 1013 (1974); Richard v. Richard,
300 A.2d 637 (1973). In Massachusetts the immunity was abrogated for vehicular
torts and later for other personal injury torts; exceptions to be determined by the
court. See Lewis v. Lewis, 351 N.E.2d 526 (1976); Brown v. Brown, 409 N.E.2d 717
(1980).
32. Ellman & Sugarman, supra note 23, at 1269.
33. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS (1965).
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(a) to a member of such person's immediate family who is
present at the time, whether or not such distress results in
bodily harm, or
(b) to any other person who is present at the time, if such
distress results in bodily harm.
Not all states have considered the issue of lIED between
spouses, but there seems to be a growing trend among states to accept
the doctrine.' Only South Dakota has prohibited such claims (on
public policy grounds).35 The state of New York does not currently
recognize IIED claims between spouses.36 However, New York has in
the past allowed claims for "intentional infliction of severe emotional
distress" between common law spouses.37 Other states have dealt
with the issue with seeming acceptance, but some of them have not
found conduct outrageous enough to qualify as interspousal IIED 8
Different jurisdictions have dealt differently with the question
whether to acknowledge an lIED tort action for injuries suffered
while the parties were still married. A case in Connecticut dealt with
the situation of a wife who was emotionally damaged when her
husband falsely claimed that he had tested positive for AIDS.39 Her
husband told her that he had tested positive and was going to suffer
and die from the disease, which in fact was a lie. He instructed his
wife to take their son to Canada, their original home, so that they did
not have to watch him wither and die.4 This statement caused the
woman extreme anxiety and emotional distress, because she feared
for her husband's life, for the well-being of her son, and for herself,
because she believed that she may have contracted the disease from
her husband." Her strong belief in her husband's lie was evidenced
by the fact that she indeed followed his instructions and returned to
Canada with their son.42 However, the plaintiff later learned the truth
34. LEONARD KARP, DOMESTIC TORTS: FAMILY VIOLENCE, CONFLICT, AND
SEXUAL ABUSE 116 (vol. I, rev. ed. 2005).
35. Pickering v. Pickering, 434 N.W.2d 758 (S.D. 1989).
36. Xiao Yang Chen v. Fisher, 843 N.E.2d 723 (N.Y. 2005).
37. Murphy v. Murphy, 486 N.Y.S.2d 457 (N.Y. 1985).
38. See, e.g., Nagy v. Nagy, 210 Cal. App. 3d 1262, (Cal. 1989); Ruth v. Fletcher, 377
S.E.2d 412 (Va. 1989); Hassing v. Wortman, 333 N.W.2d 765 (Neb. 1983); Alexander v.
Inman, 825 S.W.2d 102 (Tenn. 1991).
39. Whelan v. Whelan, 41 Conn. Supp. 519, 520 (Conn. 1991).
40. Id. at 520.
41. Id. at 520.
42. Id. at 520.
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and divorced her husband. After the divorce she sued in tort,
claiming that the conduct was intentional and "extreme and
outrageous," and sought compensatory and punitive damages.43
The Supreme Court of Connecticut notes that the plaintiff does
not need to allege that the conduct resulted in illness or bodily harm,
because that is only the standard for unintentional infliction of
emotional distress. The outrageous nature of the conduct in an IIED
claim is sufficient to make a showing of actual harm unnecessary.44
The court also elaborates on the four elements of an IIED claim as
established by the Connecticut Supreme Court in a previous case in
1986:
(1) [T]hat the actor intended to inflict emotional distress; or that he
knew or should have known that emotional distress was a likely
result of his conduct; (2) that the conduct was extreme and
outrageous; (3) that the defendant's conduct was the cause of the
plaintiff's distress; and (4) that the emotional distress sustained by
41
the plaintiff was severe.
The Court notes that all divorces involve some emotional
distress, and for the plaintiff to succeed in her IIED claim, she must
allege that the defendant's conduct was more egregious than the kind
of distress suffered during the course of an ordinary divorce.46 The
Court indeed uses the ordinary IIED standard, even in the case of
spousal emotional abuse:
Liability has been found only where the conduct has been so
outrageous in character, and so extreme in degree, as to go beyond
all possible bounds of decency, and to be reTarded as atrocious, and
utterly intolerable in a civilized community.
Using this standard, the Court recognizes that the conduct of the
husband in lying about his AIDS diagnosis was outrageous enough to
allow the plaintiff's IIED claim.48 The Connecticut court reasoned
43. Id. at 520-21.
44. Id. at 521-22. To prove this standard, the court cites Prosser and Keeton,
explaining: "[I]f the enormity of the outrage itself carries conviction that there has in
fact been severe and serious mental distress, which is neither feigned nor trivial,
bodily harm is not required." Id. at 522. See W. PROSSER & W. KEETON, TORTS 64
(5th ed. 1984).
45. Id. at 521 (citing Petyan v. Ellis, 200 Conn. 243, 253 (1986)).
46. Id at 522.
47. Id. at 523 (according to RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46 cmt. d
(1976)).
48. Id. at 523.
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that a spouse ought to be able to bring additional claims that are not
covered by the divorce proceeding.49 The court therefore allowed the
claim, awarded her $362,000 in compensatory damages, but struck her
claim for punitive damages, saying that recovering compensatory
damages on a claim of outrageous behavior ought to be punitive
enough. °
An IIED claim between spouses has been acknowledged in other
cases. 1 Some of the IIED claims were accompanied by other claims
such as, assault, battery, slander or physical abuse 2 In other cases
49. Id
50. Id. at 524.
51. As another example, in Ohio, a husband sued his wife for intentional infliction
of emotional distress. Koepke v. Koepke, 556 N.E.2d 1198 (Ohio 1989). His wife had
revealed to him that he was not the father of the son born during their marriage, and
then filed for divorce. Id. When the husband sued for lIED, the lower court dismissed
the case on grounds of public policy, noting that emotional distress is often inflicted
during a divorce and the plaintiffs claims ought to be heard during the course of the
divorce and not as a separate tort suit. Id. at 1198-99. However, the Court of Appeals
decided that an lIED action should be considered independently from a divorce action.
Id. at 1200. The court lamented the fact that a party to a divorce action cannot recover
damages and does not have the right to a jury trial, both of which are fundamental to a
tort claim. Id. at 1199. The court concluded:
We acknowledge, as did the court below, that almost all divorce actions
involve some form of emotional distress. Nonetheless, in recognizing the
independent tort of emotional distress the Supreme Court of Ohio has
specifically stated that the harm involved must be serious. This high burden
of proof will help to discourage parties from bringing suits involving
ordinary and/or frivolous claims for emotional distress. We also understand
that courts have a strong interest in judicial economy. However, this
concern does not outweigh the fact that a domestic relations forum is not the
proper forum in which to litigate a tort claim.
Id. at 1200. Thus, the Court of Appeals found the lower court in error and remanded
the plaintiff's IIED claim back to the lower court for further proceedings. Id. at 1200.
In doing so, the court followed similar former decisions. See, e.g., Aubert v. Aubert,
129 N.H. 422, (N.H. 1987) (holding that a previous divorce action does not bring up
issues of res judicata when a husband tried to sue his wife for tortuous personal injuries
when she shot him in the face prior to the divorce; the personal injury action was
allowed); Stuart v. Stuart, 140 Wis. 2d 455 (Wisc. 1987) (reversing the decision of the
lower court that dismissed plaintiff wife's claims for lIED, assault and battery for
injuries that occurred to her during the marriage because of res judicata and estoppel
during the divorce action); Heacock v. Heacock, 402 Mass. 21, 520 N.E. 2d 151 (Mass.
1988) (holding that preceding divorce action did not preclude wife from bringing a tort
action for injuries suffered during assault by husband during the separation period,
while the parties were still married); Slansky v. Slansky, 553 A.2d 152 (Ver. 1988)
(holding that husband is allowed to make a claim in tort regarding wrongful conversion
and breach of trust after his wife wrongfully terminated an insurance policy, even when
the marital property had already been settled during the preceding divorce action).
52. For a summary of states that have allowed lIED claims between spouses see
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courts recognized an IIED action but rejected the specific claim
because the spouse's conduct was not sufficiently outrageous. 3 State
law requires additional conditions for acknowledgment of a spousal
IIED claim, such as proving physical abuse before allowing recovery
for mental suffering,' or accepting in general an IIED claim, but not
in cases of alienation of affections, because that entire doctrine has
been abolished in those states.5
3. Spousal Abuse Tort Law Claims in Israeli Law
In Israel, since 1969, a spouse may submit a tort claim against
their spouse. This right has been invoked, albeit to a limited extent,
in cases of breach of promise to marry,56 divorce of a woman against
KARP, vol. 1, supra note 34, at 118-35. See also Curtis v. Firth, 850 P.2d 749 (Idaho
1993) (approving compensatory and punitive damages awards for IIED against a
woman's common law husband for cyclical physical and emotional abuse); Vance v.
Chandler, 597 N.E.2d 233 (Ill. 1992) (granting IIED claim against husband who
attempted to have his wife killed); Landis v. Landis, 664 N.E.2d 754 (Ind. Ct. App.
1996) (involving very large damages claims for IIED, assault, and battery, where wife
alleged that her husband abused substances, threatened and harassed her, and placed
her at risk of HIV infection because of his adultery); Van Meter v. Van Meter, 328
N.W.2d 497 (Iowa 1983) (acknowledging an IIED claim based on physical and
emotional abuse suffered as a result of a third-party seducing a woman's husband);
Scamardo v. Dunaway, 650 So.2d 417 (La. 1995) (holding that IIED is a recognizable
tort distinct from alienation of affections); Henriksen v. Cameron, 622 A.2d 1135 (Me.
1993) (accepting interspousal IIED claims, in this case where mixed physical and
psychological abuse by husband to wife included slander, rape, and assault); Vance v.
Vance, 408 A.2d 728 (Md. 1979) (holding husband liable for emotional distress against
wife when he revealed during divorce proceedings that they had never been married);
McCoy v. Cooke, 419 N.W.2d 44 (Mich. Ct. App. 1988); Miller v. Brucks, 472 S.E.2d
350 (N.C. 1996); Massey v. Massey, 807 S.W.2d 391 (Tex. 1991), writ denied, 867
S.W.2d 766 (Tex. 1993) (stating that IIED claims between spouses without physical
injury must be accepted because a selective requirement of physical injuries for this
kind of claim between spouses violates equal protection and discriminates against
married persons); Twyrman v. Twyrman, 790 S.W.2d 819 (Tex. 1990).
53. Ruprecht v. Ruprecht, 599 A.2d 604 (N.J. 1991) (recognizing an IIED claim
between spouses without physical injury, but holding that husband's discovery that
wife's eleven years of adultery was not sufficiently outrageous); Hakkila v. Hakkila, 812
P.2d 1320 (N.M. 1991) (accepting interspousal IIED claim, but the facts in this case
were not sufficiently outrageous to be actionable); McCulloh v. Drake, 24 P.3d 1162
(Wyo. 2001) (accepting IIED claims only in cases of sufficiently outrageous conduct as
determined by the court).
54. Browning v. Browning, 584 S.W.2d 406 (Ky. 1979) (requiring physical abuse
before allowing recovery for mental suffering, in this case holding that a wife could not
sue her husband for damages arising from his alleged affair).
55. Wilson v. Still, 819 P.2d 714 (Okla. 1991).
56. See, e.g., CA 245/81 Sultan v. Sultan [1984] 38(3) IsrSC 169; FamC (Tel
Aviv) 105841,105842/99 Aharon v. Basilian, Tak-Mish 2002(2) 332 [2002].
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her will,57 and in other instances in which damage to one spouse has
been caused by the actions of the other.
Israeli tort law also has no specific tort of spousal abuse. Tort
claims against a spouse for abuse can only be acknowledged if the
behavior comes under one of the existing torts. In general this would be
assault 9 (for physical or sexual abuse) or one of the framework torts:
negligence ° or breach of a lawful duty.6' Ostensibly, this is also the case
regarding parents and children, but for this set of relationships there is
also the Capacity and Guardianship Law,62 which permits claims for
breach of lawful duty to be brought more easily in addition to other tort
claims. No corresponding law exists with respect to spousal relations,
and so the road to such claims between spouses is more difficult and
convoluted: proving that other laws, falling under family law, have been
breached as a result of the behavior in question is much harder,
particularly when it comes to emotional abuse. In the case of physical or
sexual abuse, a claim for assault may be brought, but this cause of action
is not sufficient. In principle, one may sue for physical, sexual, or
emotional abuse under the tort of negligence. The claimant must prove
that a duty of care existing between spouses was breached, by arguing
that the abuse is a breach of the duty of care in spousal relations.63 But
negligence is a tort that is subject to considerations of legal policy, and
extension of its umbrella is not a matter of course. In addition, these two
framework torts, breach of a lawful duty and negligence, require proof of
damages as one of the cumulative foundations for the tort, while the tort
of assault does not require such proof.
Although the impediment to entering a tort claim against a
spouse was actually removed in 1969, in fact there are only a few such
claims. Tort claims between spouses for physical and emotional
abuse first arose in 2005. As we have said, the tort of negligence
requires proof of damages, but at times this is difficult to prove. For
abuse classed under the heading of assault, there is no need to prove
57. See, e.g., CA 1730/92 Masarwa v. Masarwa, Dinim Elyon38, 369 [1995].
58. See, for example, FamC (Tel Aviv) 64901/96 Polack v. Polack, Tak-Mish 2001(3)
83 [2001], in regard to assault of the wife by the husband and in regard to the wife's
negligence in destroying common property; we will relate to other, newer rulings later in
this chapter.
59. Civil Wrongs Ordinance, supra note 18, § 23.
60. Id. at §§ 35 and 36.
61. Pursuant to the Civil Wrongs Ordinance, supra note 18, § 63.
62. Capacity and Guardianship Law, 5722-1962, S. H. 380 5722, at 120.
63. Civil Wrongs Ordinance, supra note 18, §§ 35 and 36.
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damages, but where we are dealing with long-term behavior, with
each instance of physical blows being limited, the concern arises that
the compensation will not be significant. In these instances, the more
significant component has to be compensation for non-pecuniary
damages, and in Israel the level of these is traditionally not high,
although there is no legislative limit to them.
There is another problem in treating the ongoing tort of abuse in
spousal relations like assault against a non-relative. At times the real
harm - again, particularly non-pecuniary harm - is immeasurably
greater, since the behavior is ongoing, even if on each occasion the
behavior was relatively low key. The family relationship is, in any
case, stressful and problematic at times, and when this is accompanied
by abuse, the situation can become insufferable. All this requires a
suitable legal response.
Nevertheless, two noteworthy cases were recently decided by the
family court. In both, the court acknowledged a claim against a
spouse for emotional abuse. The first case involved physical abuse
while the second did not. The fact that the court accepted the claims
indicates that judicial rulings provide a suitable response for tort
claims for spousal abuse; however, the response is not sufficient.
The first case, that of FamC, was brought before Judge Nili
Maimon in the Family Court in Jerusalem. 64 The case related to a
couple who were married in 1995, when the wife was aged 16. They
lived in the home of the husband's parents along with the husband's
five brothers and their children. According to the statement of claim,
a short time after the marriage, the husband and other members of
his family commenced a five-year campaign of severe physical and
emotional abuse toward the wife.6 ' The wife sued the husband
64. FamC (Jerusalem) 18551/00 K.S. v. K.M., unpublished (7.6.04).
65. The husband attacked her numerous times, slapped her, dragged her by the
hair, struck her on all parts of her body and head, caused her to vomit, shouted at her,
cursed her, spat on her, humiliated and insulted her, forbade her from leaving her room
and prevented her from using the telephone. She claimed that his family also treated
her in a degrading way, as a servant. Following one of the instances of assault, the
woman left for her parents' home. She returned some days later, following a promise
from her husband and his family that they would not strike her, and then, for a period
of two months, the husband and his family totally shunned her since she had "dared" to
run away to her parents; they refrained from speaking to her, from eating or sitting with
her, and all her attempts at closeness were rebuffed. The husband's mother threatened
that, should she again leave for her parents' home, her husband would divorce her and
she would be shunned by them. During the whole of this period, the wife was forced,
together with the husband's mother, to carry out all the household duties for the whole
family, until her legs pained her and she required medical treatment. She became
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claiming degradation, humiliation and emotional abuse, in addition to
the acts of physical assault.66 She argued that the acts establish the
foundation of the tort of assault and justify the award of punitive
damages that would express revulsion to these acts. 67  Thus, she
claimed damages for pain, suffering and emotional distress, including
punitive damages, in the sum of 155,000 NIS (approximately
$45,000).68
The judge ruled that the behaviors described indeed constituted a
severe infringement of the plaintiff's dignity as a free individual, and a
severe affront to her autonomy in carrying on a normal lifestyle, to
conduct her life as she saw fit, to carry on family life and raise her
children in a normal, reasonable manner, and a severe offense against
her feelings. 69 The tort of assault clearly exists here. However, in
addition, the judge sought an appropriate category for the humiliating
behavior and affront to her dignity, autonomy and feelings.0 She notes
that the list of torts in the Civil Wrongs Ordinance in Israel does not
include a basis for tort claims grounded in intentionally infringing a
person's dignity and autonomy to conduct his or her life without
interference, or harming a person through humiliation, degradation, or
emotional and psychological abuse.7" The judge called on the
legislature to act and establish a specific tort of emotional abuse to
combat this serious social phenomenon and to protect an individual's
dignity and autonomy from humiliation and degradation.72 She even
proposed that the legislation establish compensation, up to a certain
sum, without having to prove specific emotional damage.73 In her
view, the basic goal of tort law is to resolve conflicts between
depressed and asked her husband to take her for medical treatment. He refused.
Seeing that her physical and emotional state had worsened, he brought her a
pediatrician, who gave her an inappropriate medication. She claimed that she was also
drugged. Subsequently she was hospitalized with a particularly serious psychological
condition, suffering from severe anxiety, refusing to eat, disconnected from her
surroundings, trembling, fearful, in a state of obvious restlessness, staring constantly
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individuals,74 and any harm, not just monetary, should entitle the
victim to suitable compensation.75 The judge argued that it is not
proper that the compensation may only be awarded for emotional
abuse if the acts were accompanied by physical assault.76 Emotional
abuse should be considered separately, and it should constitute a
separate basis for compensation.77 In principle, Israeli tort law sees
no problem in compensation for actual emotion damage - if such is
proven - as "loss of amenity. '7 8 In the present case, some of the
damage was cause by the assault, and thus the situation regarding this
point is simpler.
Judge Maimon imposed aggravated damages as a result of the
malicious behavior of the husband-respondent.7 9 In her view, in the
case of domestic violence, the harm to the wife is even greater than in
the case of ordinary assault. 8° According to the judge, a person's
home is their castle, and a person who is attacked within their home is
left helpless and without somewhere secure to be.8' Thus, the
consequential emotional damage is greater. And this is especially so
when the wife is attacked by her husband, the person with whom the
relationship is meant to be special from an emotional perspective,
74. See Steven D. Smith, The Critics and the 'Crisis A Reassessment of Current
Conceptions of Tort Law, 72 CORNELL L. REV. 765,766 (1987).
75. FamC 18551/00, supra note 64.
76. Id.
77. The judge was not satisfied with merely criticizing the legislature. She
attempted to examine the claim through the framework tort of negligence. Id. To
the complex question of whether a deliberate act can still fall under the category of
negligence, she responds in the affirmative. Id. According to the court, a conceptual
duty of care applies to relations between husband and wife, since there is a special
emotional relationship between husband and wife. Id. Both husband and wife have
an obligation to treat the other fairly and with respect, and in a manner that permits
them to conduct their life in a normal, reasonable way. The judge notes that the
relationship between the spouses was unequal from the start; due to her youth, the
wife was dependent on her husband. Id. In analyzing the husband's actions, the judge
concluded that a concrete duty of care existed. Id. The husband's abnormal behavior
constitutes a breach of this duty of care - he should have expected that his behavior
would lead to the harm done to her, since any reasonable person would be able to
predict that such behavior would lead to an infringement of dignity and emotional
damage. Id.
78. See generally CA 243/83 Municipality of Jerusalem v. Gordon [1985] 39(1)
IsrSC 113. Specifically in regard to emotional damage of a child from his father's
emotional abuse, see CA 2034/98 Amin v. Amin [1999] 53(5) IsrSC 69, available at
http://elyonl.court.gov.il/files-eng/98/340/020/q07/98020340.q07.htm.
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vulnerable and trusting. Finally, the judge awarded compensation
for: loss of amenity and emotional damage - 20,000 NIS
(approximately $5,700), with the addition of 70,000 NIS
(approximately $20,000) compensation for bodily harm, for harm to
dignity, autonomy, feelings, comfort and loss of amenity, for the
inability to live a normal, reasonable life, and for the influence of all
these on her psychological and emotional state thereafter.
The husband's appeal was brought before Judge Yosef Shapira,
in the Jerusalem District Court."' The judge concurred with the
determination of the lower court that the tort of negligence is
pertinent to deliberate or malicious acts, and also concurred that the
husband's behavior constituted a breach of his duty of care toward his
wife.83  The court indicated that this is not a new tort, but an
interpretation of the scope of an existing tort - negligence.'
The district court acknowledged the difficulty that terms such as
humiliation, degradation, infringement of dignity and impairment of
autonomy are highly subjective." According to the court, a similar
argument was made in a former case, Amin,86 in which a person was
sued for emotional damage caused to his children.87 The father
argued that recognition of the claim, on the basis of a value
determination, relying on economic considerations of legal policy,
may lead to a slippery slope.s This argument was again made in the
appeal to the Supreme Court in the Amin case.89 Here, Judge Shapira
cites the Supreme Court's rejection of the slippery slope argument:
The 'slippery slope' argument cannot withstand rejecting the
doctrine of immunity. Courts have many 'stop-gaps' in using
different techniques for imposing liability, and they can sort cases
according to their severity. Claims for de minimis harms will be
dismissed immediately .... 90
Counsel for the appellant expressed his concern that recognizing the
right of the respondents to compensation from their father for the
82. FamA (Jerusalem) 595/04, John Doe v. Jane Doe, unpublished (2.24.05).
83. Id. T 10-14.
84. Id. T 14.
85. Id 15.
86. Amin, supra note 78.
87. FamA 595/04, supra note 82, 16.
88. Id.
89. Amin, supra note 78 (J. Orr).
90. Id. T 16 of Justice Englard's ruling.
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emotional harm caused to them would lead the court down a slippery
slope... Indeed, there is no doubt that the relationship between
parents and children is often complex and emotionally-laden. It is
not immune from frustrations, disappointments, and disillusionment,
whether mutual or one-sided, which are likely to give rise to the
feeling that one side has not fulfilled his or her duties with the
appropriate amount of dedication. The court, therefore, should be
doubly cautious in addressing these issues, and must take care not to
intrude unnecessarily upon this delicate fabric of relations. It must
not clear the way for a wave of tort claims of children against parents,
claims which are based in complex life circumstances which are
difficult to judge in retrospect. Parents are not immune from errors
in judgment during the course of such a long and complicated
relationship. The court must exercise appropriate caution in drawing
the line delineating when it will intervene by recognizing a cause of
action in tort by a child against his or her parent. Appropriate
judicial policy dictates that only in extreme cases will parents' acts or
omissions rise to the level of the negligence sufficient to sustain a tort
claim against them.9'
Judge Shapira explains that this is also applicable to claims
between spouses, and summarizes the matter as follows:
It seems that the same is true even of the relationship between a
husband and wife. We would note that, with the developing
recognition in our legal system of the protection of spousal rights,
one cannot minimize the importance of the couple's autonomy in
shaping their relationship within their private lives. Now, there is
no doubt that there are certain aspects of the relationship between
a couple that are outside the bounds of legal determination, but the
very difficulty in determining the boundaries for recognition of
legal responsibility does not justify giving immunity against claims
for degradation, humiliation, infringement of dignity and
impairment of a spouse's autonomy. It is the court, which dictates
the appropriate legal policy, that determines these boundaries, and
its intervention only occurs in the extreme instances that justify it.
The lower court viewed the subject matter of this ruling as an
extreme instance justifying judicial intervention, and I find no
justification whatsoever to interfere with this determination. It
should be known, that aggression by a spouse, or abuse of one
spouse by the other, will not only harm the delicate fabric of the
marriage relationship, or family relationships, in both the narrow
and broad sense of the term, but will hurt the pocket of the attacker
91. FamA 595/04, supra note 82, 1 16.
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or offender.
92
The judge concurred with the lower court that it was appropriate
to award aggravated damages, and argued that, under the
circumstances, this was not at all an excessive award.93 In sum, the
acts of assault, degradation and abuse constituted a tort, particularly
as the acts were carried out in the framework of the sensitive
relationship between husband and wife living under the same roof
and caring for children.9 Both courts concluded that emotional abuse
is a recognized ground in tort.
The second case, tried before Judge Menachem HaCohen of the
Jerusalem Family Court, dealt with the claim of a woman for various
damages, particularly emotional, as a result of her husband's refusal
to obtain a religious divorce - a get.95 In addition, the husband
repeatedly tormented his wife by saying that they would go, "one last
time," to another rabbi, and undertaking to carry out the rabbi's
decision regarding the get, while having no intention of keeping his
promise.' Judge HaCohen concurred with the view of Judge
Maimon, and held that it would be appropriate to establish a specific
tort to provide a response to physical and emotional abuse within the
family. ' He also stressed the ability to award damages for suffering,
loss of amenity and loss of comfort. 98 The refusal to grant a get was
held to constitute an attack on the wife's autonomy, her right to self-
actualization. According to the judge, we can easily appreciate the
wife's bitter disappointment, and the sorrow, humiliation,
degradation and pain that she felt, at each get proceeding.1°° This was
a clear instance in which aggravated damages ought to be awarded.
The court thus awarded damages from the time that the rabbinic
court ordered the husband to grant a get totaling 325,000 NIS
(approximately $93,000) with a further 100,000 NIS (approximately
92. Id IT 16-17.
93. Id 21.
94. Id
95. FamC (Jerusalem) 19720/03 K.S. v. K.P., unpublished (12.21.04). For other
similar following judgments see FamC (Kfar-Saba) 19480/05 Jane Doe v. The Estate
of John Doe, unpublished (4.30.06); FamC (Jerusalem) 6743/02 C v. C., unpublished
(7.21.08).
96. FamC (Jerusalem) 19720/03, supra note 95, IT 9-13, 85.
97. Id 63.
98. Id IT 73-80.
99. Id. I 82-83.
100. Id. IT 84-85.
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$28,600) for aggravated damages."'
The outcome was similar in both cases in two respects: (1) non-
pecuniary harm due to emotional abuse can be the basis for
compensation; and (2) the court called on the legislature to establish a
new tort of spousal emotional abuse. Would the court have reached
the same outcome in the first case, had it not also involved physical
assault, but only emotional abuse? It would seem that this specific
court would have, and the fact is that, the second case related solely to
emotional abuse. However, the tort of negligence is subject to judicial
policy, and in these specific instances the judicial policy of the judges
sitting on these cases benefited the plaintiff; however, we can imagine
an alternative possibility, in which the court would not take this
approach. These two cases serve only as a leading case for the lower
courts and not as binding precedent, since the Israeli Supreme Court
has not yet dealt with the issue.
In Israel, the possibility of awarding punitive damages has also
been recognized in cases based on the tort of negligence, but the courts
generally do so only in extreme cases, generally only if the damage was
caused maliciously,'" only in particularly outrageous or abhorrent
instances, and particularly when accompanied by deliberate intent.
Unlike the case of medical negligence, which still involves a positive
intent in its origin, in regard to spousal abuse, it is more appropriate to
talk of punitive damages. However, we would stress that use of this is
rare. Therefore, an alternative possibility may be more suitable for our
purposes: to use the similar, but different, approach of aggravated
damages. These damages also take into account the seriousness of the
defendant-damager's behavior, and are similar to punitive damages in
that they are awarded in instances in which there is an element of
intent or maliciousness. In Israel, they reflect an honest evaluation of
the damage caused, when this damage is aggravated by the
inappropriate behavior of the tortfeasor. These damages are awarded
particularly in instances of non-pecuniary damage, such as damage to
reputation or feelings,' ° and thus that may be particularly appropriate
to the tort of emotional abuse. In any event, in both of the above cases,
aggravated damages were awarded.
101. Id. T 93.
102. CA 140/00 Estate of Ettinger v. Jewish Quarter Reconstruction and
Development Corporation et al, and Counter-Appeal, Tak-El2004(1) 2452 [2004].
103. CA 9656/03 Estate of Marziano v. Dr. Zinger [2005] 2005(2) Tak-E1125.
104. CA 802/97 Nof v. Avneri [1991] 45(2) IsrSC 494, 489.
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4. Conclusion and Critique
While American and Israeli law deals with the tort of spousal
abuse, there is no specific tort of spousal abuse in American or Israeli
law. In addition, American and Israeli tort law does not view
emotional abuse in the same way it views and handles other forms of
abuse (physical and sexual). There is no real reason not to enact a
standard tort of spousal abuse in all countries. There is no reason for
different laws, meaning that a spouse under the same set of facts may
be able to sue his or her spouse in one state, but not another. And, to
the detriment of abused spouses, some states even do not allow
spouses to sue for such claims. A uniform tort of spousal abuse, that
includes emotional abuse, which sometimes is worse than other forms
of abuse, could be a good idea in all states. This tort should include
intentional infliction of emotional distress, since emotional abuse is
sometimes more severe than physical, especially in domestic relations.
On one hand, it may lead to more lawsuits between spouses and
harm family tranquility. On the other hand, the current law that
seems to disfavor lawsuits brought by spouses is wrong. After all, a
spouse should have at least the same, if not a greater duty not to
abuse his or her partner than a stranger or a co-worker. If relations
between spouses are so bad that one of them abuses the other, and
the latter wants to file a claim against the former, it means that there
is no harmony and tranquility in that house anyhow.
In the U.S., there is no clear rule for interspousal tort claims in
general and in cases of IIED in particular. Less than half the states
have written laws allowing IIED claims between spouses; in the other
states, the question is still open. Nevertheless, it seems that the
general trend in the U.S. is towards abolishing interspousal immunity
and accepting tort law claims, even for IIED. The situation is similar
in Israeli law. As discussed above, all types of abuse may be
considered via the tort of negligence, although here it is necessary to
prove damage. That being the case, emotional abuse is generally
harder to prove, although by no means impossible.
Thus there is ample room for a separate tort of abuse, which could
give expression to the totality of the special relationship between the
couple and the fact that the relationship is continuing and that the tort
is ongoing. For this, legislative intervention, in the form of creating a
clearly differentiated tort of abuse, is required. Such a tort must
include both physical and sexual abuse, as well as emotional abuse.
The need for such a tort arises particularly in light of the problematic
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treatment of emotional abuse under the present legal situation.
Furthermore, it may be appropriate in cases of abuse that reflects
ongoing, serial behavior, to award aggravated, if not punitive,
damages. Consistent awarding of aggravated and even punitive
damages for the tort of spousal abuse may repair the "flaw" under
which courts in Israel generally award low sums for pain and suffering
(non-pecuniary damages). This is not meant as a punishment for the
tortfeasor. It would, however, be an award of justified compensation
to the spouse who has been abused for a long time, and whose needs
are not satisfied by the existing law. The legislature, both in the U.S.
and Israel, can determine, for example, that punitive or aggregated
damages could be awarded in interspousal torts too, subject to the
courts' discretion, in severe cases only, and subject to some limitation
(e.g., no more than 20 percent or 50 percent of the original damage).
B. Spousal Abuse in Common Criminal Law
This section will deal with criminal legal treatment of spousal
abuse. Traditionally, criminal law under the common law did not
even include an offense of rape of a wife by her husband. Like tort
law, this aspect of criminal law was based on the understanding that
the law did not wish to intervene in such relations between husband
and wife. Notwithstanding advances in this area, the criminal law
generally does not include a separate offense of spousal abuse, and
the general offenses are not sufficient in this context. Here we shall
see a clear lack of uniformity in handling such cases between the
various American states, and a lack of uniformity of approach to the
various types of abuse.
1. Spousal Abuse Criminal Law Claims in American Law
The U.S. has no specific federal criminal laws against spousal
abuse, with the exception of the federal 1994 Violence Against Women
Act.' °5 This law imposes rather heavy federal criminal sanctions (fines
and/or up to twenty years in prison) for traveling or causing another
person to travel across state lines for the purpose of committing
spousal abuse (including an effort to kill, injure, harass, or intimidate a
domestic partner) or in order to violate a state's protective order.'
6
The abuser is thus subject to federal criminal penalties if s/he engages
105. 42 U.S.C. §13981 (1994).
106. Michele M. Hughes, Domestic Abuse and Violence, 28 C.J.S. DOMESTIC
ABUSE AND VIOLENCE SUMMARY, 1, 6-7 (2008).
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in such a crime. ' °7 However, this statute deals only with traveling from
state to state. It means that it is inadequate, since for the majority of
situations, there probably will be no interstate travel and thus the
federal Act would not apply.' °8
Some states do have specific domestic abuse felonies, although
some of those only apply to some forms of abuse."M In addition, most
of the existing domestic abuse statutes are usually protective, not
criminal."' The purpose of the statutes is to provide protection and
facilitate the granting of protective orders, meaning that the relief
granted is generally injunctive."' The statutes usually define domestic
abuse as an act that approximates assault, or sometimes a lesser
offense. ' 2 Most of the states have no specific felonies for spousal or
107. Id. at 6-7.
108. Admittedly, the only way the federal government can regulate in this field is
via the Commerce Clause of the U.S. Constitution and thus any law must be
interstate in nature.. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 3.
109. Alabama (Ala. Code §§ 13A-6-130 et seq. (2008). According to the statute,
domestic violence in the first degree is a class A felony; it is defined as normal assault
when the person assaulted is a spouse, family member, domestic partner, etc. Alabama
also has domestic violence in second and third degree based on the level of assault.);
Arizona (Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 13-3601 (2008). Crimes of domestic violence are
generally considered in Arizona as normal crimes committed against family members.
Three convictions of domestic violence can result in a felony for the third offense.
Also, crimes of domestic violence with a firearm or against pregnant women can receive
harsher punishments.); California (Cal. Fam. Code § 6211 (2008)); Maryland (Md.
Code Ann., Fam. Law § 4-501 (2008). Domestic abuse is defined as the commission of
standard crimes against the person, etc. amongst family or partners; Mississippi (Miss.
Code Ann. § 97-3-7 (2008). An assault against certain family members is considered a
crime of domestic violence with a punishment identical to normal assault, except the
third domestic violence related assault (even if against different victims) in five years
becomes a felony (this is not the case for normal assault)); Ohio (Ohio Rev. Code Ann.
§ 2919.25 (2008). Domestic violence is a misdemeanor in Ohio, but can become a
felony on the second or third offense, depending on the severity of the crime);
Oklahoma (22 Okl. St. § 60.1 (2008) (for domestic abuse), and 21 Okl. St. § 853 (2008)
(a felony of abandonment). There seems to be no specific felony for domestic abuse in
Oklahoma, but it is a felony to abandon one's spouse and/or children in "destitute and
necessitous circumstances"; South Carolina (S.C. Code Ann. § 20-4-20 (2007) (domestic
abuse)), and S.C. Code Ann. § 16-3-615 (2007) (spousal sexual battery). No specific
domestic abuse felonies exist in South Carolina, except a felony for "spousal sexual
battery" which is similar to spousal rape; Virginia (Va. Code Ann. § 18.2-57.2 (2008).
"Assault against a family member" becomes a felony in Virginia upon the third
conviction; West Virginia (W. Va. Code § 61-2-28 (2008). Domestic violence is normally
in West Virginia a misdemeanor offense, but becomes a felony upon the third offense.).
110. Hughes, supra note 106, at 9.
111. ld. at 54-55.
112. Id. at 3-4. Thus, an abused spouse applies for a protective order, and only when
the abusive spouse violates that order is he or she punished. Abusers are generally held
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partner abuse; at most they define domestic abuse as fitting within the
normal definition of existing felonies such as assault and do not
include any special or increased criminal punishments for domestic
abuse."3 Special punishments exist in some state's laws usually for
violation of protective orders only.'
in contempt of court for violating the protective order and sometimes are punished
criminally.
113. Alaska (Ala. Stat. § 18.66.990 (2008). Alaska seems to have no specific crime
of domestic abuse, and it just considers normal definitions of assault, stalking,
harassment, etc. against family members); Arkansas (Ark. Code Ann. § 9-15-101
(2008)); Georgia (Ga. Code Ann. § 19-13-1 (2008)); Indiana (Ind. Code §§ 34-26-1-5
(2008) et seq.); Kentucky (Ken. Rev. Stat. Ann. §§ 403.720 (2008) et seq.); Louisiana
(La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 46:2131 (2008)); Massachusetts (Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 209A, §§
1 (2008) et seq.); Nevada (Nev. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 33.018 (2007)); New Hampshire
(N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 173-B:1 (2008)); New Mexico (N.M. Stat. Ann. §§ 40-13-2
(2008) et seq.); New York (N.Y. Fam. Ct. Act § 828 (2008)); North Carolina (N.C.
Gen. Stat. § 50B-1 (2008)); North Dakota (N.D. Cent. Code § 14-07.1-01 (2008));
Oregon (Or. Rev. Stat. § 107.705 (2007)); Pennsylvania (23 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 6102
(2007)); Rhode Island (R.I. Gen. Laws § 8-8.1-1 (2008)); South Dakota (S.D.
Codified Laws § 25-10-1 (2008)); Tennessee (Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-3-601 (2008));
Texas (Tex. Fam. Code § 71.004 (2007)); Utah (Utah Code Ann. § 30-6-1 (2008));
Vermont (15 Ver. Stat. Ann. § 1101'(2007)); Washington (Wa. Rev. Code § 26.50.010
(2008)); Wisconsin (Wis. Stat. § 813.12 (2007)); Wyoming (Wyo. Stat. § 35-21-102
(2007)); Washington, D.C. (D.C. Code § 16-1001 (2008)).
114. Colorado (a section on domestic abuse was repealed: Colo. Rev. Stat. § 14-4-
101 (2007). It was replaced with a section on civil protective orders: Colo. Rev. Stat. §§
13-14-101 (2007) et seq.); Connecticut (Conn. Gen. Stat. § 46b-15 (2008)); Delaware (10
Del. Code § 1041 (2008)); Florida (Fla. Stat. §§ 741.28 (2008) et seq.); Hawaii (Haw. Rev.
Stat. § 586-1 (2008)); Idaho (Idaho Code §§ 39-6303 (2008) et seq.); Illinois (750 Ill. Comp.
Stat. §§ 60/102 (2008) et seq.); Iowa (Iowa Code § 236.2 (2008) et seq.); Kansas (Kan.
Stat. Ann. §§ 60-3102 (2006) et seq.); Maine (Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 19 §§ 4002 (2008) et
seq.); Michigan (Mich. Comp. Laws prec. § 400.1501 (2008)); Minnesota (Minn. Stat. §
518B.01 (2007)); Missouri (§§ 455.010 Mo. Rev. Stat. (2008) et seq.); Montana (Mont.
Code Ann. § 40-15-102 (2007)); Nebraska (Neb. Rev. Stat. §§ 42-902 (2008) et seq.); New
Jersey (N.J. Stat. § 2C:25-30 (2008)). Violating a protective order is considered contempt
of court, and can be civil or criminal - it depends on the state's statute. Hughes, supra
note 106, at 102. When the contempt is civil, it is not punitive in nature, but rather
designed to cause the abuser to comply with the statute. Id For example, a judge may
order a monetary punishment that can be avoided if the violator has good behavior and
never again violates the order. Id. Some domestic violence statutes allow for monetary
relief. When granting the civil protective order, the trial court can also award monetary
relief for damages that the battered spouse may have sustained, such as physical injuries,
moving expenses, counseling expenses, pain and suffering, or even punitive damages. Id
at 62. Some statutes allow for attorneys' fees. Id at 62-63. However, monetary awards
cannot be granted ex parte (even though some civil protective orders can be granted ex
parte), and an adversarial hearing is required to award monetary damages. Id. at 63.
When the statute allows criminal contempt of court, the standards are higher: the
government has the usual burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that the
defendant willfully disobeyed the court order and caused an obstruction of justice. Id. at
102. The order must be clear and not ambiguous, the defendant is entitled to due process
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There is room for a particular offense of spousal abuse, for the
same reasons that we have noted in the discussion of tort law above.
Since each state has offenses of assault and rape, charges can be
pressed in principal against a physical and sexual abuser on the
grounds of these offenses, but the lack of an offense for emotional
abuse is very problematic.
2. Spousal Abuse Criminal Law Claims in Israeli Law
Israel's Penal Law does not include a crime of abuse, except in
regard to minors or helpless persons."' As such, this offense does not
seem to apply to women who have been battered or humiliated by their
husbands. They are not included within the definition of "helpless
person," according to the commonly held interpretation, since this
definition includes only those who, because of their age, illness, or
physical or mental infirmity, mental deficiency or any other cause,
cannot provide the needs of their livelihood, health or welfare. "6 That
being so, the case of a battered woman can only be brought before the
criminal courts if her husband committed the offenses of threatening
behavior, violence, assault, imprisonment or sexual offenses - general
offenses recognized under the penal law. It is hard to argue that
emotional abuse is included under any of these.
Regarding assault and sexual offenses within the family
framework, there is a specific law within the Penal Law that imposes
penalties more severe than those imposed for the same offenses
carried out by non-family members."7 These general offenses of
physical assault, rape, or indecent assault, do not necessarily fall
under the category of abuse, but at least some form of legal
arrangement is in place regarding them. Emotional abuse, on the
other hand, is a kind of step-child: assault is defined specifically as
"use of force,"''18 and sexual crimes do not necessarily include force.
In other words, these offenses may include emotional abuse, in
addition to force or sex, but the emotional abuse alone does not
constitute an offense under the Penal Law. Even the special
arrangement regarding violence within the family, which permits the
rights, and some states require the order to be written (a verbal order is insufficient). Id.
at 103.
115. Penal Law § 368c, 5737-1977, S. H. 864,226 [hereinafter Penal Law].
116. Id. at § 368c.
117. §§ 382(b) and (c) with regard to physical assault in the family, and § 351(c) of
the Penal Law in respect of sexual offenses within the family.
118. Id. at § 379.
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offender to be sent for treatment under a probationary order,119 does
not apply to emotional or psychological abuse.
3. Conclusion and Critique
Both American law and Israeli law suffer from similar problems
in the context of spousal abuse in criminal law. The Family Court in
Israel called on the legislature to enact not only a tort, but also a
concrete criminal offense, related to emotional abuse not
accompanied by physical assault.2 There is no justification for there
to be a different attitude, on the part of the Israeli or American
legislatures, or that of individual states, toward sexual or violent
behavior, for which offenses exist in the penal codes, as opposed to
emotional abuse, for which there is no specific offense, and which
does not even come under framework of existing offenses. However,
it would be appropriate to define an offense covering all types of
abuse, and not only emotional, against a spouse, which takes into
account severe behavior specifically within the family framework and
the heightened stress and suffering when a close relative carries out
such acts, while the victim has nowhere to run.
To distinguish between assault and abuse we may use the test
established by the Israeli Supreme Court in a case dealing with child
abuse.121 The court held that abuse, including physical abuse, refers to
cases of a nature and type that our conscience and feelings cannot
regard merely as acts of assault.122 Abuse involves elements of
cruelty, intimidation or degradation, and it thus acquires a stigma of
immorality, which does not necessarily accompany every criminal act
that involves the use of force. 23 The offense of abuse is one of
behavior and not of consequence, and thus the prosecution is not
required to prove that actual damage or suffering has been caused to
the victim in order to obtain a conviction for abuse.24 According to
the court, whether the behavior has the potential to cause harm or
suffering can be assessed by the following criteria: (1) from the
contact and the nature of the physical measure adopted; (2) from the
119. See id. at § 86.
120. FamC (Jerusalem) 18551/00, supra note 64.
121. CrimA 4596/98 Jane Doe v. Israel [2000] IsrSC 54(1) 145. English version
available at http://elyonl.court.gov.il/files-eng/98/960/045/n02/98045960.n02.htm.
122. Id. T 13 (J. Beinish).
123. Id. T 13-14 (J. Beinish).
124. Id. 14 (J. Beinish).
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degree of force used against the victim and its power; (3) from the
context and the circumstances in which the force or the physical
measure were used; (4) from the frequency of their use and from the
period of time over which they were used; (5) from the systematic
nature of the use of force or the physical measure; (6) from the
exceptional nature of the behavior and from its deviation from what
is accepted by society.12' These criteria are also appropriate in regard
to physical and sexual abuse of a spouse. In regard to emotional
abuse, the terms "force" or "physical measure" need only be replaced
by "insulting and humiliating behavior." Finally, the determination
that a particular behavior constitutes abuse, based on these
parameters, is made by examining the objective viewpoint of a
reasonable observer, and not the subjective assessment of the abuser
or victim.
126
The above leads us to conclude that it would indeed be
appropriate to establish a similar offense of abuse - physical, and, for
our purposes, sexual and emotional - of a spouse, and rely on
significant portions of the definition of abuse given in rulings relating
to minors and helpless persons, for interpretation of the concept and
its applicability in each instance.
We would emphasize that the problem is particularly severe in
regard to emotional abuse, since the penal laws already include
offenses relating to assault, assault occasioning bodily harm, and
sexual offenses. Although these offenses are not specific to a victim
who is the spouse of the offender, they do provide a certain legal
response. However, in our view this is insufficient in light of the need
to consider the special relationship between spouses. The penal law,
on the other hand, does not provide any effective response to
emotional abuse.
C. Common Family Law: Protective Orders
1. Protective Orders in American Law
The issue of domestic violence protective orders in the United
States began with the erosion of the spousal immunity doctrine in the
1970s.' 27 In general, the primary remedy is a court order that directs
125. Id (J. Beinish).
126. Id 14 (J. Beinish).
127. Karp, supra note 34, at 68-69.
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the defendant to refrain from engaging in further acts of domestic
violence or harassing the petitioner.128 Protective orders often give
temporary possession of the family residence to the petitioner and
order the defendant to stay away from the residence, and require a
showing that abuse would be likely to occur without such an order.
2 9
The order may take additional steps, such as directing the defendant
to stay away from the petitioner's work or school or even to pay for
the petitioner to be housed somewhere else.'30 Many of the states'
statutes also consider long-term remedies; for example, many have a
provision allowing courts to order counseling.' Some states also
allow courts to temporarily award custody, visitation, child support,
spousal support, and costs (including attorneys' fees) in the protective
order proceeding.'32  This additional relief is allowed even if the
parties have not begun divorce proceedings.'33 Some states extend the
power of the inferior courts (like magistrates' courts) to provide for
this type of relief.' This is extraordinary, since inferior courts usually
do not have jurisdiction over such matters.'35 Even when such relief is
specifically unavailable to the inferior courts, their orders can still
have broad power.1
3 6
The interests deprived of the defendant in the awarding of a
protective order are fundamental; his/her property interests are
affected when s/he is ordered to stay away from home, and his/her
liberty interests are affected if s/he is deprived of his/her relationship
with his/her children.'37 Therefore, ex parte protective orders have
been challenged on constitutional grounds.38 A variety of states have
upheld the constitutionality of the ex parte orders have been upheld;
courts have held that the statutes are valid and that notice to the
defendant is normally required except in cases where there is a risk of
128. Id at 75.
129. Id
130. Id
131. Id. at 76. Connecticut's statute even directs courts to provide assistance to
the abused victim and pretrial education to the offenders. Id. at 77.
132. Id at 75-76 (West Virginia, Illinois, South Carolina, and the situation in
Arizona).
133. Id at 76.
134. Id at 75-76 (referring to Arizona).
135. Id at 76.
136. Id.
137. Id at 73.
138. Id
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immediate harm.19  The present situation is that emergency orders
are generally acceptable, even without notice to the person being
deprived of important interests, as long as there is a chance of
immediate harm.
40
Today, all states have statutes that establish procedures for
obtaining domestic violence protective orders.'41  In addition to the
state laws, there are some relevant provisions in the 1994 federal
Violence Against Woman Act.'42  As mentioned above, this law
imposes heavy federal criminal sanctions (fines and/or prison) for
traveling or causing another person to travel across state lines for the
purpose of committing spousal abuse or violating a state's protective
order.4 Additionally, the law forces state courts to recognize ("give
full faith and credit to") protective orders from other states.' 4' Even
ex parte protective orders must be recognized by other states,
provided the abuser had notice and reasonable opportunity to be
heard.'46 Finally, the law requires that the abuser pay restitution and
make a new cause of action in civil rights for gender-based violence.
4 7
The state statues that outline protective orders are generally
similar, especially in remedies and procedures, but do have some
differences because there is no model statute from which the states
could establish their law. 148 Protective orders are available to any
member of a household, not just spouses.9 In addition, the orders
139. Id. The cases upholding the ex parte orders are the following: Blazel v.
Bradley, 698 F. Supp. 756 (W.D. Wis. 1988); Williams v. Marsh, 626 S.W.2d 223 (Mo.
1982); Marquette v. Marquette, 686 P.2d 990 (Okla. Civ App. 1984); Boyle v. Boyle,
12 Pa. D. & C.3d 767 (1979). It should be emphasized that all states currently have ex
parte orders available to domestic violence victims, except South Carolina, which has
instead an expedited hearing available within 24 hours. S.C. Code Ann. § 20-4-50
(2007).
140. Karp, supra note 34, at 73.
141. Id. at 69-70.
142. 42 U.S.C. § 13981.
143. See supra text accompanying notes 105-08.
144. Karp, supra note 34, at 69.
145. Id. To satisfy due process, the courts are only forced to recognize those orders
that were originally ordered by courts with subject matter jurisdiction, personal
jurisdiction over the abuser, and that gave the abuser notice and reasonable
opportunity for a hearing. See id.
146. Id.
147. Id. at 70.
148. Id. at 70-71.
149. This includes children, relatives, and unrelated household members. See id
at 71. The trend is towards expansion of who can apply for a domestic violence
protective order, with some states moving towards allowing non-household
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are supposed to be designed so that they are easy to obtain.'
The procedures also vary among the states. 5' Most states have a
procedure for an ex parte emergency order, which is issued
immediately without notice to the adverse party.'52 Generally, these
ex parte orders only last for a short period of time, with ten days
being typical. "3 Protective orders which are not ex parte allow notice
to the adverse party and an opportunity for that party to be heard.'
An order issued after a two-party hearing will last much longer, from
ninety days to two years, depending on the state."5
Generally, the petitioner has to swear that there has been some
past abuse, i.e., the petitioner has to allege abuse but does not have to
show that someone called the police.'56 The allegations that form the
basis of a protective order vary from state to state.5 7 All protective
order statutes are designed with the purpose of preventing physical
abuse.' Some states allow protective orders for sexual abuse and/or
emotional or verbal abuse/distress as well, but in a few states they are
unmarried partners with children and even simply current or past sexual partners. Id
Most states also allow a family/household member to apply for a protective order not
only for himself/herself but for his/her minor children as well. Id. For example, in
Minnesota, protective orders are available to couples who have children together,
even if they are unmarried and have never lived together. Id. at 72. However,
Minnesota refused to allow a pregnant woman in such a situation to apply for a
protective order against the child's father, stating that the child must be already born
for a couple to be considered as having children together. Id.; see also Woodin v.
Rasmussen, 455 N.W.2d 535 (Minn. Ct. App. 1990). On the other hand, the rule in
the state of New York allows a protective order to be issued of behalf of an unborn
child. Karp, supra note 26, at 72; see Gloria C. v. William C., 476 N.Y.S.2d 991 (N.Y.
Fam. Ct. 1984).
150. Karp, supra note 34, at 71. For example, some states allow the petitioner to
apply in a court of inferior jurisdiction, such as a magistrate's court, which makes the
application procedure much less intimidating for the abuse victim. Id. at 71-72.
Many states have designed their forms to be simple, which is very beneficial to
petitioners who do not have an attorney. Id. at 72.
151. Id. at 73.
152. Id
153. Id.
154. Id. at 74.
155. Id
156. Id. at 72-73. An example on one end of the spectrum is the state of Arizona,
where the petitioner has to swear that a specific named offense occurred, such as
assault, endangerment, unlawful restraint, kidnapping, or property damage. Id at 73.
On the other hand, in the state of Florida a person only has to allege that there was a
threat of abuse or that she simply believes she is in danger. Id.
157. Id. at 72-73.
158. Id. at 75.
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allowed only for severe emotional distress.9
159. The following states explicitly provide for sexual abuse, and only some of them
provide for emotional abuse: Alabama (Ala. Code §§ 30-5-1 et seq. It includes any
abuse or threats of abuse, which includes physical abuse, sexual abuse, harassment,
property damage, etc. § 30-5-1 (2007)); Arkansas (Ark. Code Ann. §§ 9-15-101 et seq.
It includes prior or attempted physical injury, threat of physical injury and criminal
sexual conduct. § 9-15-103 (2008)); Florida (Fla. Stat. Ann. § 741.30. It is applied to
victim of domestic violence or reason to believe that domestic violence will occur;
domestic violence defined as: "assault, aggravated assault, battery, aggravated battery,
sexual assault, sexual battery, stalking, aggravated stalking, kidnapping, false
imprisonment, or any criminal offense resulting in physical injury or death." § 741.28
(2007)); Idaho (Idaho Code §§ 39-6301 et seq. It includes prior or attempted physical
injury, threat of physical injury, sexual abuse or imprisonment and threats of sexual
abuse or imprisonment. § 39-6301 (2007)); Illinois (750 Ill. Comp. Stat. § 60/101 et seq.
It includes prior or attempted physical injury. § 60/103 (2008)); Kentucky (Ky. Rev.
Stat. 88 403.715 et seq. It includes prior or attempted physical injury, threat of physical
injury, sexual abuse, and threat of sexual abuse. § 403.720 (2008)); Louisiana (La. Rev.
Stat. Ann. §§ 46:2131 et seq. It includes prior or attempted physical injury, any offense
against the person, which includes sexual abuse. § 46:2131 (2008)); Maine (Me. Rev.
Stat. §§ 19-A § 4001 et seq. It includes prior or attempted physical injury, threat of
physical injury, sexual abuse, forcibly moving a person or restricting their movements,
verbal harassment, and stalking. Me. Rev. Stat. §§ 19-A § 4002 (2007)); Maryland (Md.
Code Ann., Fam. Law §§ 4-501 et seq. It includes prior or attempted physical injury,
threat of physical injury, stalking, imprisonment, and sexual abuse or attempted sexual
abuse. § 4-501 (2008)); Michigan (Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. §§ 600.2950, 2950(A). It
includes prior or attempted physical injury, assault, molesting and stalking. § 600.2950
(2007)); Minnesota (Minn. Stat. Ann. § 518B.01. It includes prior or attempted physical
injury, threat of physical injury and criminal sexual conduct. § 518B.01 (2007));
Mississippi (Miss. Code Ann. §§ 93-21-1 et seq. It includes prior or attempted physical
injury, threat of physical injury, stalking, cyberstalking, and sexual offenses. § 93-21-3
(2007)); Missouri (Mo. Rev. Stat. §§ 455.010 et seq. It includes prior or attempted
physical injury, threat of physical injury, harassment, sexual assault, and unlawful
imprisonment. § 455.010 (2007)); Montana (Mont. Code Ann. § 40-15-201, et seq. It
includes prior or attempted physical injury, threat of physical injury, and sexual assault.
§ 40-15-102 (2007)); Nebraska (Neb. Rev. Stat. §§ 42-901 et seq. It includes prior or
attempted physical injury, threat of physical injury, and sexual contact without consent.
§ 42-903 (2007)); New Jersey (N.J. Stat. Ann. 38 2C:25-17 et seq. It includes prior or
attempted physical injury, threat of physical injury, harassment (including verbal), and
sexual abuse. § 2C:25-19 (2007)); New Hampshire (N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. §§ 173-B:1 et
seq. It includes prior or attempted physical injury, threat of physical injury, harassment
(including verbal), and sexual assault. § 173-B:1 (2008)); Nevada (Nev. Rev. Stat. §§
33.017 et seq. It includes prior or attempted physical injury, threat of physical injury,
harassment (stalking, trespass, larceny, carrying a weapon with a permit, property
damage, etc.), sexual assault, and unlawful imprisonment. § 33.018 (2007)); North
Dakota (N.D. Cent. Code §§ 14-07.1-01 et seq. It includes prior or attempted physical
injury, threat of physical injury, and sexual assault. § 14-07.1-01); Ohio (Ohio Rev.
Code Ann. § 3113.31. It includes prior or attempted physical injury, threat of physical
injury, stalking, aggravated trespass, and sexual offenses. § 3113.31 (2008)); Oregon
(Or. Rev. Stat. §§ 107.700 et seq. It includes prior or attempted physical injury, threat
of physical injury, and forced sexual relations. § 107.705 (2005)); Pennsylvania (23 Pa.
Cons. Stat. Ann. §§ 6101 et seq. It includes prior or attempted physical injury, threat of
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physical injury, sexual assault, and imprisonment. § 6102 (2007)); Rhode Island (R.I.
Gen. Laws §§ 8-8.1-1 et seq. It includes prior or attempted physical injury, threat of
physical injury, stalking, cyberstalking, and sexual assault. § 8-8.1-1 (2007)); South
Carolina (S.C. Code Ann. §§ 20-4-10 et seq. It includes prior or attempted physical
injury, threat of physical injury, and sexual assault. § 20-4-20 (2006)); Texas (Tex. Fam.
Code Ann. §§ 81.001 et seq. It includes prior or attempted physical injury, threat of
physical injury, emotional or verbal abuse, and sexual assault. § 71.004 (2007));
Vermont (Vt. Stat. Ann. Tit. 15, §§ 1101 et seq. It includes prior or attempted physical
injury, threat of physical injury, stalking, and sexual assault. § 1101 (2007));
Washington (Wash. Rev. Code Ann. §§ 26.50.010 et seq. It includes prior or attempted
physical injury, threat of physical injury, and sexual assault. § 26.50.010 (2008));
Washington, D.C. (D.C. Code §§ 16-1001 et seq. It includes any ordinary criminal
offense. § 16-1001 (2007)); West Virginia (W. Va. Code §§ 48-26-101 et seq. It includes
prior or attempted physical injury, threat of physical injury, psychological abuse, and
sexual abuse. § 48-27-202 (2007)); Wisconsin (Wis. Stat. Ann. §§ 813.12 et seq. It
includes prior or attempted physical injury, threat of physical injury, sexual assault, and
property damage. § 813.12 (2006)); Wyoming (Wyo. Stat. Ann. §§ 35-21-101 et seq. It
includes prior or attempted physical injury, threat of physical injury, and sexual assault.
§ 35-21-102 (2007)).
The following states provide for sexual abuse, and some of them provide for emotional
abuse as well: Alaska (Alaska Stat. §§ 18.66.100 to 18.66.180) § 18.66.100 (2008);
Arizona (Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. §§ 13-3601, 3602. It includes prior or attempted physical
injury, threat of physical injury, emotional or verbal abuse, almost any type of
harassment. § 13-3601 (2007)); California (Cal. Fam. Code §§ 6220 et seq. It includes
prior or attempted physical injury, threat of physical injury, prior or attempted abuse. §
6250 (2007)); Colorado (Colo. Rev. Stat. §§ 13-14-101 et seq. It includes prior or
attempted physical injury, threat of physical injury, emotional or verbal abuse, financial
control, document control, property control, and other types of control that make a
victim more likely to return to an abuser due to fear of retaliation or inability to meet
basic needs. §13-14-102 (2007)); Delaware (Del. Code. Ann. tit. 10, § 1043 et seq. It
includes immediate and present danger of domestic violence. § 1043 (2008)); Georgia
(Ga. Code. Ann. §§ 19-13-1 et seq. It includes any felony or battery, simple battery,
simple assault, assault, stalking, criminal damage to property, unlawful restraint, or
criminal trespass. § 19-13-1 (2007)); Hawaii (Haw. Rev. Stat. §§ 586-1 et seq. It
includes any "[p]hysical harm, bodily injury, assault, or the threat of imminent physical
harm, bodily injury, or assault, extreme psychological abuse or malicious property
damage" that has occurred or is there is threat of imminent occurrence. § 586-1
(2007)); Indiana (Ind. Code § 34-26-1-5 et seq. It includes any domestic violence or
stalking. § 34-26-1-5 (2007)); Massachusetts (Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. 209A §§ 1 et seq.
It includes prior or attempted physical injury, threat of physical injury, and sexual
abuse. 209A §§ 1 (2007)); New Mexico (N.M. Stat. Ann. §§ 40-13-1 et seq. It includes
prior or attempted physical injury, threat of physical injury, harassment, or an action
that results in severe emotional distress. § 40-13-1 (2007)); New York (N.Y. Fam. Ct.
Act §§ 821-28, 832-36, 838, 841-47. It includes prior or attempted physical injury, threat
of physical injury, harassment, stalking, disorderly conduct, etc. § 821 (2007));
Oklahoma (22 Okla. Stat. Ann. §§ 60 et seq. It includes prior or attempted physical
injury, threat of physical injury, stalking, harassment (including verbal, as long as it
causes severe emotional distress). § 60.1 (2007); Virginia (Va. Code Ann. §§ 16.1-253.1
et seq; § 16.1-279.1. It includes acts involving violence, force, threats which cause bodily
injury, or fear of bodily injury. § 16.1-228 (2007)).
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Punishments for violating the orders vary by state. 6° The usual
violation is a misdemeanor offense and is considered either a civil or
criminal contempt of court, punishable by fine or incarceration.'6
Washington, D.C., allows a private individual to prosecute a criminal
contempt action.'62 In New Jersey, the law allows the court to impose
compensatory and punitive damages upon a domestic violence
offender.' 63 In some states a portion of the fine can go to petitioner
and dependents if the court so orders, and in other states the fine can
go either to the party injured by violation or to pay for professional
counseling.'6
The following states do not provide for sexual abuse or emotional abuse: Connecticut
(Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 46b-15. It includes prior or attempted physical injury,
threat of physical injury. § 46b-15 (2007)); Iowa (Iowa Code Ann. §§ 236.1 et seq. It
includes prior or attempted physical injury, threat of physical injury § 236.2 (2008));
Kansas (Kan. Civ. Proc. Code Ann. §§ 60-3101 et seq. It includes prior or attempted
physical injury, threat of physical injury, for non-spouse minors under 16: any sexual
intercourse or lewd fondling or touching (by either party) with intent to arouse desire
(of either party). § 60-3102 (2006)); North Carolina (N.C. Gen. Stat. §§ 50B-1 et seq.
It includes prior or attempted physical injury, threat of physical injury. § 50B-1
(2007)); South Dakota (S.D. Codified Laws § 25-10-1 et seq. It includes prior or
attempted physical injury, threat of physical injury. § 25-10-1 (2008)); Tennessee
(Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 36-3-601 et seq. It includes prior or attempted physical injury,
and threat of physical injury. § 36-3-601 (2008)); Utah (Utah Code Ann. §§ 30-6-1 et
seq. It includes prior or attempted physical injury, or threat of physical injury. § 30-6-
1 (2007)).




164. This is the full picture of punishments in the different jurisdictions: Alabama
(Ala. Code §§ 30-5-1 et seq. 1: Class A misdemeanor; 2: prison no less than 30 days;
3: prison no less than 120 days, and a payment for 1/3 of the cost of incarceration, that
will go to general fund for county jail administration. § 30-5-9 (2007)); Alaska
(Alaska Stat. §§ 18.66.100 to 18.66.180: Some specific protective orders may be a
misdemeanor; prison no more than 1 year; fine no more than $5,000; or both);
Arizona (Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. §§ 13-3601, 3602 (2007)); Arkansas (Ark. Stat. Ann.
§§ 9-15-101 et seq. Class A misdemeanor; prison no more than 1 year; fine no more
than $1,000; or both); California (Cal. Fain. Code §§ 6220 et seq. Basic:
Misdemeanor; fine no more than $1,000; prison no more than 1 year; or both;
however, if physical injury results, fine no more than $2,000; prison between 30 days
and 1 year (but possible reduction). If the abuser is on probation from violation, s/he
can pay shelter or victim fine as long as it would not interfere with support payments.
Cal. Penal Code § 273.6 (2007)); Colorado (Colo. Rev. Stat. §§ 13-14-101 et seq.
Contempt; C.R.S.A. § 14-4-105 (2007), but also possibly Class 2 Misdemeanor or
Class 1 Misdemeanor if the abuser was previously convicted of analogous ordinance
or protection order under 18-1-1001. C.R.S.A. § 18-6-803.5 (2007)); Connecticut
(Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 46b-15. Contempt; whatever sanctions court finds
appropriate; if the violation includes trespass, then the punishment is Class A
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misdemeanor and prison no more than 1 year, fine no more than $2,000 or both.
C.G.S.A. § 46b-15 (2008)); Delaware (Del. Code Ann. tit. 10, § 1043 et seq.
Contempt; Class A misdemeanor; prison/fine/both. 10 Del. Code § 1046 (2008));
Florida (Fla. Stat. Ann. § 741.30. Contempt (punishment not enumerated).
Misdemeanor in the 1st degree, prison no more than 1 year, fine no more than $1,000.
F.S.A. § 741.31 (2007)); Georgia (Ga. Code Ann. §§ 19-13-1 et seq. Contempt. Ga.
Code Ann. § 19-13-6 (2007); Misdemeanor. Ga. Code Ann. § 16-5-95 (2007)); Hawaii
(Haw. Rev. Stat. §§ 586-1 et seq. 1: Misdemeanor, prison no less than 48 hours, fine
between $250 and $1000; 2: prison no less than 30 days, fine between $150 and $500;
3: same as 2 (in all cases where the defendant only fined if s/he is able to pay the
fine). H.R.S. § 586-11 (2007)); Idaho (Idaho Code §§ 39-6301 et seq. Misdemeanor,
prison no more than 1 year and fine no more than $5,000 (of which $10 to domestic
violence project). I.C. § 39-6312 (2007)); Illinois (750 Ill. Comp. Stat. § 60/101 et seq.
Contempt or Misdemeanor; court encouraged to increase the penalty for each
subsequent violation. 750 I.L.C.S. 60/223 (2007)); Indiana (Ind. Code § 34-26-1-5 et
seq. Contempt.); Iowa (Iowa Code Ann. §§ 236.1 et seq. Contempt, Misdemeanor.);
Kansas (Kan. Civ. Proc. Code Ann. §§ 60-3101 et seq. In Kansas the issue depends on
the context: a Class B nonperson misdemeanor (criminal trespass), class A person
misdemeanor (second instance of domestic battery in 5 years), class C person
misdemeanor (assault), class B person misdemeanor (battery, first instance of
domestic battery), person felony (third instance of domestic battery). Kan. Stat.
Ann. § 21-3412a (2006)); Kentucky (Ky. Rev. Stat. §§ 403.715 et seq. Contempt,
K.R.S. § 403.760 (2007); Class A misdemeanor, K.R.S. § 403.763 (2007)); Louisiana
(La. Rev. Stat. Ann. §§ 46:2131 et seq. Contempt; prison no more than 6 months, fine
no more than $500, or both, court can order any of the portion of fine to go to
petitioner and dependents. There are no limitations on criminal proceedings.
L.R.S.A. 46:2137 (2007)); Maine (Me. Rev. Stat. tit. 19-A § 4001 et seq. Class D
crime; Contempt; Class C Crime if reckless or assault. M.R.S.A. tit. 19-A § 4011
(2007)); Maryland (Md. Fam. Law Code Ann. §§ 4-501 et seq. Contempt, § 4-508
(2008). Misdemeanor, 1: fine no more than $1,000, prison no more than 90 days, or
both; 2 and after: fine no more than $2,500, prison no more than 1 year, or both, § 4-
509 (2008)); Massachusetts (Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. 209A §§ 1 et seq. Criminal
(unspecified category), fine no more than $5,000, prison no more than 2.5 years, or
both, plus fine of $25 for General Fund, batterer's intervention program. If
retaliatory for plaintiff reporting defendant for failure to pay child support, fine no
less than $1,000, prison no less than 60 days. 209A § 7 (2008)); Michigan (Mich.
Comp. Laws Ann. §§ 600.2950, 2950(A). Criminal contempt, 600.1701 (2008));
Minnesota (Minn. Stat. Ann. § 518B.01. Contempt, Misdemeanor, prison no less than
3 days and counseling. § 518B.01 (2007)); Mississippi (Miss. Code Ann. §§ 93-21-1 et
seq. Either Contempt or Misdemeanor but not both, Misdemeanor: prison no more
than 6 months, fine no more than $1,000, or both. § 93-21-21 (2007)); Missouri (Mo.
Rev. Stat. §§ 455.010 et seq. 1: Class A misdemeanor, 2: if within 5 years of 1st
violation, class D felony. 455.085 (2007)); Montana (Mont. Code Ann., § 40-15-201 et
seq. Criminal. If assault/stalking, 1: prison no more than 1 year, fine no more than
$1,000 or both; 2 and after: fine no more than $10,000, prison no more than 5 years,
or both. § 45-5-220 (2007). Otherwise, 1: fine no more than $500, prison no more
than 6 months, or both; 2: $200 no more than fine no more than $500, 24 hours no
more than prison no more than 6 months, or both; 3 and after: $500 no more than
fine no more than $2,000, 10 days no more than prison no more than 2 years, or both.
§ 45-5-626 (2007). From § 40-15-204 (2007)); Nebraska (Neb. Rev. Stat. §§ 42-901 et
seq. 1: Class II Misdemeanor; 2A (if previously violated any protection order) Class I
Misdemeanor or 2B (if previously violated this protection order or order for same
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plaintiff) Class IV Felony. § 42-924 (2007)); Nevada (Nev. Rev. Stat. §§ 33.017 et seq.
Misdemeanor, unless a more severe penalty is prescribed by law for the act that
constitutes the violation of order or injunction. § 125.560 (2007)); New Hampshire
(N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. §§ 173-B:1 et seq. Criminal contempt. Class A Misdemeanor,
and enhanced underlying criminal charges if previously violated protective order in
any jurisdiction within 6 years. § 173-B:9 (2008)); New Jersey (N.J. Stat. Ann. §§
2C:25-17 et seq. Contempt. § 2C:25-30 (2007)); New Mexico (N.M. Stat. Ann. § 40-
13-1 et seq. 1: Misdemeanor; 2 and later: jail no less than 72 consecutive hours; full
restitution to party injured by violation and professional counseling. Criminal charges
for behavior also appropriate. § 40-13-6 (2008)); New York (N.Y. Fam. Ct. Act §§
821-828, 832-836, 838, 841-847. Contempt. It can also be transferred to criminal
division for criminal charges. § 846 (2007)); North Carolina (N.C. Gen. Stat. §§ 50B-I
et seq. Class Al Misdemeanor; if committing a felony while violating, the abuser may
be guilty of a felony one class higher than the principal felony. If s/he is convicted of 3
offenses under this Chapter, or possession of deadly weapon, it is a Class H felony. §
50B-4.1 (2007)); North Dakota (N.D. Cent. Code §§ 14-07.1-01 et seq. 1: Class A
Misdemeanor and Contempt; 2 and later: Class C Felony. § 14-07.1-06 (2007)); Ohio
(Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 3113.31. Contempt; Criminal prosecution. § 3113.31 (2008).
1: Misdemeanor of the 1st degree; 2: Felony of the 5th degree. If violated order while
committing a felony, the violation is a Felony of the 3rd degree. § 2919.27 (2008));
Oklahoma (22 Okla. Stat. Ann. §§ 60 et seq. 1: Misdemeanor, fine no more than
$1,000, prison no more than 1 year, or both; 2 and more: Felony, prison between 1
and 3 years, fine between $2,000 and $10,000, or both. But if violation results in
physical injury, 1: Misdemeanor, prison between 20 days and 1 year, fine no more
than $5,000 or both; 2: Felony, prison between 1 and 5 years, fine between $3,000 and
$10,000, or both, and the degree of the physical injury must be taken into account. §
60.6 (2007)); Oregon (Or. Rev. Stat. § 107.700 et seq. Contempt. § 107.720 (2007));
Pennsylvania (23 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. §§ 6101 et seq. Private criminal
complaint/indirect criminal contempt. § 6113.1 (2007). Indirect criminal contempt,
elaborate sentencing guideline. § 6114 (2007). Civil contempt. § 6114.1 (2007));
Rhode Island (R.I. Gen. Laws §§ 8-8.1-1 et seq. Contempt, but also other civil and
criminal remedies. If the defendant had actual notice of protective order,
Misdemeanor, fine no more than $1,000, prison no more than 1 year, or both. § 8-8.1-
3 (2007)); South Carolina (S.C. Code Ann. §§ 20-4-10 et seq. Criminal offense: 30
days in jail, or $2,000, or Contempt: prison no more than 1 year, fine no more than
$1,500. § 20-4-60 (2007)); South Dakota (S.D. Codified Laws § 25-10-1 et seq. 1: Class
1 Misdemeanor, or if assault, Class 6 Felony; 3 or more (within 5 years): Class 6
Felony. § 25-10-13 (2007)); Tennessee (Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 36-3-601 et seq.
Contempt. § 36-3-612 (2007)); Texas (Tex. Fam. Code Ann. §§ 81.001 et seq.
Contempt, fine no more than $500, prison no more than 6 months, or both. § 85.026
(2007)); Utah (Utah Code Ann. §§ 0-6-1 et seq. Contempt, Class A Misdemeanor. §
30-6-4.2 (2007)); Vermont (Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 15, §§ 1101 et seq. Criminal contempt,
$1,000 or 6 months prison or both. § 1108 (2008)); Virginia (Va. Code Ann. §§ 16.1-
253.1 et seq; § 16.1-279.1. 1: Class 1 Misdemeanor; 2 (if within 5 years or if either
offense was based on an act or threat of violence): prison no less than 60 days; 3 (if
within 20 years of 1st conviction, and any offense based on an act or threat of
violence): Class 6 Felony, prison no less than 6 months. If it is about assault or
battery, or trespass, it is a Class 6 Felony, plus any other penalty provided by law. §
16.1-253.2 (2008)); Washington (Wash. Rev. Code Ann. §§ 26.50.010 et seq.
Contempt. 26.50.120 (2008)); Washington, D.C. (D.C. Code §§ 16-1001 et seq.
Contempt or Misdemeanor; fine no more than $1,000; prison no more than 180 days
(same for either contempt or misdemeanor). § 16-1005 (2008)); West Virginia (W.
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It should be noted that there is an alternative path for protective
orders. Before the states adopted laws regarding domestic violence
protective orders, abused spouses could - and still can - apply for an
injunction or a temporary restraining order.1 65 However, the domestic
violence protective order is usually preferable because it is more
effective in protecting the petitioner.' 66 In addition, the protective
order can be used along with other remedies. 167 For example, in a
state where an inferior court has limited power, a petitioner would
file for a protective order to receive immediate relief, then (quickly)
file in the district court a divorce action and a request for a restraining
order or injunction to determine custody, visitation, and support.'
6
However, the protective order remains the fastest and most effective
way for a person to receive immediate relief in a time of eminent
threat of abuse.
1 69
The relatively heavy punishments for violating a protective order,
together with its wide provisions, its simplicity (that enables the
petitioner to submit an application without a need for a lawyer), and its
accessibility usually make it a good incentive to prevent spousal abuse.
Va. Code §§ 48-26-101 et seq. Civil contempt. § 48-27-901 (2007). Criminal
complaints. § 48-27-902 (2007). 1: Misdemeanor, between 1 day and 1 year in prison
and fine between $250 and $2,000; 2 or more: Misdemeanor, prison between 3
months and 1 year, fine between $500 and $3,000, or both. § 48-27-903 (2007));
Wisconsin (Wis. Stat. Ann. §§ 813.12 et seq. Fine no more than $1,000, prison no
more than 9 months, or both. § 813.12 (2007)); Wyoming (Wyo. Stat. §§ 35-21-101 to
35-21-107. Criminal, does not preclude other civil or criminal remedies. § 35-21-106
(2007). Misdemeanor, prison no more than 6 months, fine no more than $750, or
both. § 6-4-404 (2007)).
165. Karp, supra note 34, at 91. A normal preliminary injunction is used during a
proceeding for separation or marriage dissolution. Id. The preliminary injunction is
binding upon both the petitioner and respondent and is a court order enforceable by
contempt of court or criminal interference with judicial proceedings. Id The
preliminary injunction does order both parties not to harass, molest, and assault each
other, but law enforcement will generally not prosecute criminally because the
injunction is not an order of protection. Id. The temporary restraining order is very
similar to the emergency protective order in that it is an ex parte order. Id. at 92.
However, the petitioner must show that s/he is unable to notify the adverse party or
that doing so would cause irreparable harm. Id. Like the ex parte protective orders,
the restraining orders last for a very short time, such as ten days, before a hearing
must be set so that the adverse party can be heard. Id. Injunctions may be used
before divorce proceedings to have similar effects as restraining orders, but they
cannot be used in emergencies, as the adverse party must be notified and granted a
hearing. Id.
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Nevertheless, in certain states the orders do not cover sexual abuse or
emotional or verbal abuse/distress (or sometimes include only severe
emotional abuse). There is no real justification for that differentiation;
the statutes should be amended.
2. Protective Orders in Israeli Law
Civil family law in Israel addresses the various forms of violence
slightly better than the tort and criminal laws surveyed above.
Violence is grounds for obtaining a restraining order against the
violent or abusive perpetrator. On the other hand, emotional abuse is
recognized more rarely than physical or sexual violence.
Various methods can be used to remove a violent family member
from the home: as a condition of bail or as an alternative to remand in
criminal law, under the powers of the Family Court in claims for child
support and tranquil domestic accommodations, as well as pursuant to
the Family Violence Prevention Law ("FVPL").7 ° The FVPL gave the
magistrates' courts, the Family Court and the religious courts (e.g.
Rabbinical Courts), for the first time, extensive powers to take effective
steps against a violent family member. 7' Until the FVPL was enacted, it
was generally the victim who had to leave their home and family until
the legal position was clarified (the classic example was that of a battered
wife moving to a shelter). For the first time, the law permits the violent
individual, rather than the victim, to be removed from the home by
means of a protective order, irrespective of prior criminal or civil
proceedings.
An application for a protective order may be submitted
independently, or as part of another family law application, perhaps
under a claim for tranquil living conditions.'72 However, the FVPL also
provides that the court may grant a protective order at the application of
a family member, the State Attorney-General, a police prosecutor or a
welfare officer.'73 Allowing external bodies to submit an application is
understandable, since the victim is not always able or willing to do it.
The protective order has the short term goal of providing an
immediate, urgent remedy, a kind of protective "first aid," and a
longer term purpose of preventing a recurrence of such violence. In
this regard the court and welfare bodies join forces to eliminate
170. Family Violence Prevention Law [hereinafter FVPL], 1991, S.H. 1352,138.
171. Id at § 1.
172. Id. at 178, § 12.
173. Id. at § 3.
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domestic violence or to find a proper way to protect the affected
family member over time.
Removal of the offender, as a protective step, is not used as
frequently. Even when this approach is used, it is not sufficient to
completely prevent violence in the family. However, it does lessen
points of friction and attempts to provide protection for the period of
the order's validity. The limited period of time established by the
court is supposed to allow the parties and the community agencies to
act on the therapeutic level to prevent a recurrence of the violent
behavior in the future, while recognizing that the offender cannot be
removed indefinitely from his home.
The conditions for granting a protective order are similar to the
classic situation in most parts of the United States. According to §3(1) of
the FVPL, an order may be granted if, shortly prior to submission of the
application, a person behaved violently toward a family member,
perpetrated a sexual offense or unlawfully imprisoned him. The
provisions here thus cover both physical and sexual abuse. § 3(2) of the
FVPL states that the behavior provides a reasonable basis for
assuming that one family member constitutes a clear physical danger
to another family member, or that he is likely to perpetrate a sexual
offense. This alternative thus deals with the apprehension of harm,
and not with harm that has already occurred. Under this provision, a
protective order may be granted if the court is convinced that the
behavior provides a reasonable basis for such apprehension. In
general, the apprehension of danger fits in with a pattern of regular,
repeated violent acts; however, at times, even a single act by the
family member may be so violent that it indicates a future risk, and
this is sufficient to grant such a protective order.74 The act may not
substantiate grounds for obtaining an order under § 3(1), but it would
provide grounds under § 3(2), for example in the case of raising a
hand in a threatening manner, or throwing dangerous objects.7 ' In
any event, this alternative is relevant only to clear physical danger,
and it therefore it does not relate to emotional abuse.
In contrast, § 3(3) of the FVPL does relate to emotional abuse.
Specifically, it applies to a person who has emotionally abused a family
174. E.g., FamC (Jerusalem) 27105/97 Jane Doe v. John Doe, [1999] Tak-Mish
99(3) 100.
175. The decision in FamC (Jerusalem) 27105/97 also mentions acts such as:
throwing a plate with boiling food; serious threats; cocking a weapon; and drawing a
knife.
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member on an ongoing basis, or has behaved in a manner that does not
permit the family member to conduct his/her life in a reasonable, normal
manner. Unlike § 3(1), even if no act of violence had been perpetrated
shortly prior to submission of the application, an application may be
submitted, provided that it does relate to an ongoing abusive pattern and
not to a single violent act that did not carry with it the risk of future
violence. This section was added to the law in 1996.116 The explanatory
note to the bill indicated that its purpose was drawn from Jewish law
(laws relating to tranquil living arrangements), which was already
established precedent in the area of personal status law.'77 Thus, in N- v.
Mr, it was held that, even prior to the law's amendment, a restraining
order could be based on emotional abuse that violated the duty to
provide tranquil domestic accommodation, which was described as the
obligation to provide a place of residence without exposure to
insufferable acts of violence or irritation on the part of the spouse of his
agent.1
7 8
Thus, emotional abuse has been included, since the 1996
amendment, in the conditions for granting a protective order.
However, unlike physical or sexual violence, it is necessary that the
emotional abuse be ongoing, or a behavior that does not permit
normal or reasonable conduct of one's life. 179 This parallels the
situation in those states in the United States that specifically require
severe emotional abuse.'8 It is not clear why such a distinction was
made. Similarly, it is unclear why § 3(2) of the FVPL, which speaks
of concern for imminent behavior, applies only to clear physical
danger or apprehension of sexual offenses, and not to emotional
abuse.
181 t, reLike the situation in most American states, protective orders in
Israel are not limited to restraining orders. The FVPL provides a range
of tools to deal with violent family members, such as a prohibition
against entering the dwelling or being found within a certain distance
from it, even if the person subject to the order has proprietary rights in
the residence.' The order may include a prohibition against harassing
176. Proposed bill for Family Violence Prevention (Amendment No. 3) Law,
5757-1996, H. H. 2562,11.18.96.
177. Id.
178. Nir, supra note 1, at 527.
179. FVPL, supra note 178, § 3(3).
180. See the text, supra next to note 166.
181. See the text, supra next to note 172.
182. FVPL, supra note 178, § 2(a).
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family members in any way and in any place, 83 and a "blanket"
prohibition against acting in any way that prevents or interferes with the
use of an asset that is lawfully used by the family members, even if the
subject of the order also has rights in that asset." 4
The protective order is given for a period of no longer than three
months, but its validity may be extended.' The court may also cancel
the order, or modify it."6 A protective order may also be granted ex
parte.'r A hearing in the presence of both parties must be held at the
earliest possible opportunity, and not later than seven days from
granting the order." However, §3(3) of the FVPL differs and requires
that a hearing on a protective order application for emotional abuse
always be in the presence of both parties (unless the respondent had
been properly served with a summons and did not appear). The
explanatory note accompanying the original bill of 1996 stated that the
reason for this distinction is that the urgency of such an order is
generally less than in the case of protective orders aimed at preventing
physical or sexual violence, and also because it would be difficult for
the court to determine whether emotional abuse of one family member
by another indeed existed without hearing both parties."9 Again,
emotional abuse has been relegated to an inferior status.
Granting an ex parte protective order may be very hard on the
family unit, particularly since this is a speedy remedy, which is exempt
from court filing fees and does not require legal representation. ' 9° Thus,
we should not ignore the possibility of frivolous complaints and
malicious use of such orders. However, application to the court for an ex
parte protection order places a heavy responsibility on the applicant.
The court needs to be vigilant and avoid granting such orders as a matter
of course. Thus, in Israeli law, an attempt has been made to balance the
situation, by means of mechanisms to deal with specious complaints: the
legislature was aware of the possibility of the law being exploited
183. FVPL, supra note 178, § 2(a)(2).
184. Id. at § 2(a)(3).
185. Id at § 5(a). The Court is entitled to extend the validity of the order from
time to time, provided that the total period does not exceed six months. Extension of
the order beyond this period requires that "special reasons" be set forth in the
decision.
186. Id.
187. Id at § 4(a).
188. Id.
189. Proposed bill for Family Violence Prevention (Amendment No. 3) Law,
5757-1996, H. H. 2562, 11.18.96.
190. FVPL, supra note 178, §§ 3-4.
2009l
Hastings Int'l & Comp. L. Rev.
maliciously (for example by couples in the midst of divorce proceedings)
and therefore §11 of the FVPL establishes that costs and compensation
may be imposed for submission of a frivolous application (not restricted
to ex parte proceedings).
Judicial rulings have also expanded the provisions of the FVPL. A
ruling by the Supreme Court established the conditions that have to be
proven in fact for the grant of a protective order on the grounds of
domestic violence:"' the existence of a clear and present danger to
members of the family; ' the violent act is of particular severity;93 it has
to be proven who is responsible for the conflict and when it began;'94 and
emotional violence may serve as a basis for a protective order, but only
in exceptional cases.95 This last factor narrows somewhat the
determination of the Ni v. Ni precedent, in which it was ruled that a
spouse may be removed from the family residence in cases of emotional,
and not just physical, violence.96 Thus, there is a difference between
emotional abuse, which serves as grounds for granting an order only in
exceptional cases, and other kinds of physical abuse.
In addition to the FVPL, Israel also enacted the Prevention of
Stalking Law, which applies to family and non-family members
alike) 97 This law is similar in many respects to the FVPL but does
differ in some significant respects. For example, the provisions of
protective orders are more detailed here than under the FVPL'98 and
orders issued pursuant to it are valid for longer periods.' 99 Both laws
expressly state that they "coexist," with neither arrangement taking
precedence over the other2 O
191. Decision by President Meir Shamgar in CA 4480/93 John Doe v. Jane Doe
[1994] IsrSC 48(3) 461, 470, based particularly on CA 192/82 Sadan v. Sadan [1982]
IsrSC 36(4) 169.
192. CA 4480/93, supra note 199, at 470.
193. Id at 470.
194. Id.
195. Id
196. Nir, supra note 1, at 527 (J. Elon).
197. Prevention of Stalking Law, 5762-2001, S. H. 1809, 6.
198. FVPL, supra note 178, § 5.
199. Id. at § 6. As we have said, protective orders under Family Violence
Prevention Law are for a period of three months; they may be extended to six months
and, under exceptional circumstances, for a longer period. Under the Prevention of
Stalking Law, the order is initially for a period of up to six months; it may be extended
to a year, and, under exceptional circumstances, up to two years.
200. FVPL, supra note 178, § 2(hl) and Prevention of Stalking Law, supra note
205, § 3.
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Due respect should be given to the legislature and the courts,
which have done sterling work in allowing for the removal of the
violent party from the home. With the 1996 amendment to the FVPL,
they were alert to the need to include emotional abuse, and not just
physical or sexual abuse, as grounds for a protective order. For some
reason, however - perhaps due to difficulties in providing proof - they
chose, like in many American states, to leave emotional abuse as kind
of "second class" grounds, to be invoked only in certain, exceptional
instances as grounds for a protective order. This is notwithstanding the
precedent established by Ni v. Nir, in which the Supreme Court
recognized that, at times, emotional violence is more severe than
physical violence.21
At times the granting of a protective order may be particularly vital,
and serve as a real lifesaver. Therefore it is disappointing that, in regard to
emotional abuse, such orders are issued only on a limited basis. It is
indeed possible to conceive of situations in which the order may be used
maliciously in disputes between couples, and may be used to take revenge
on family members. As noted previously, this is the reason §11 of the
FVPL was enacted. However, since these concerns exist for all types of
violence and abuse, there is no justification for "discriminating" against
emotional abuse in this way.
3. Conclusion and Critique
Obtaining a restraining order, both in the United States and in
Israel, is generally not too complicated a process. Legislation offers a
picture of a detailed, accessible arrangement, which, in most states, is
fundamentally balanced. The problem lies in the grounds and the
allegations. In some United States jurisdictions, a restraining order
cannot be obtained for emotional abuse. In some states and in Israel,
orders may be given only in the case of severe emotional abuse. In
other states, such orders are not available at all as to emotional abuse.
Emotional abuse is sometimes worse than other forms of abuse.
Unlike physical abuse, emotional abuse cannot be seen, and this is
possibly its danger. It is true that sometimes it is harder to prove
emotional abuse, but the courts should have full discretion to issue
protective orders for emotional abuse as well. It is thus appropriate
that the mechanism for protective orders include the possibility of
imposing costs and compensation for submitting frivolous
201. Nir, supra note 1, at 527 (J. Elon).
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applications. In regard to sexual abuse, it seems appropriate to adopt
the Israeli model, which equates sexual abuse to physical abuse in
every respect. However, there is no reason why such orders should
not apply equally to emotional abuse as well.
III. Spousal Abuse in Jewish Law
A. General Introduction
First, we would like to present a general overview of some of the
relevant sources of Jewish law. °2 In general, the principles and rules
of Jewish law are based on Scripture.03 While some rules are
mentioned quite explicitly, others are only implied. °4  All are
elucidated in the teachings of the Tannaim and Amora im - the
Rabbis of the Mishnah and Talmud- and presented systematically in
the codes.05 The Mishnah is the first topical compilation of the Oral
law (Torah shebe'al Peh), and it was completed around the year 200
C.E.2°  For some 300 years after the Mishnah's redaction,
approximately 200-500 C.E., Jewish scholarship was devoted
primarily to the study, clarification, and application of the Mishnah.2 7
The scholars from this period are known as the Amora'im and they
wrote the Talmud"' Halakhic literature after the period of the
Talmud includes codes, halakhic glosses, response literature, and
court decisions.20 ' The main codes are the Maimonides code Mishneh
Torah (1135-1204);"0 the Tur (1270-1340);21' and the Shulhan Arukh
(1488-1575), which is universally accepted as the authoritative code of
Jewish Law. 2  Thus, over the generations a comprehensive legal
system has developed, based on Scripture as elaborated by exegesis
and amplification. 3
202. See NAHUM RAKOVER, THE SOURCES OF JEWISH LAW (1994); MENACHEM
ELON, JEWISH LAW- HISTORY, SOURCES, PRINCIPLES (vol. 3, 1994).
203. Id. at 15.
204. d.
205. Id
206. Id. at 33.
207. Id at 43.
208. Id.
209. Id. at 61.
210. Id
211. Id. at 67.
212. Id at 71-72.
213. See generally id.
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Legal historians generally identify three periods in the
development of spousal relations law: (a) the period when the wife
was regarded as her husband's property; (b) the period in which the
woman merited independent, albeit unequal status and the husband
was viewed as a quasi-guardian of his wife; and (c) the modern period
in which both husband and wife have equal rights and value.21 '
Indisputably, and in a fundamental sense, Jewish law is firmly within
the third, modern period. In sources as early as the Mechilta (120-200
C.E.) we find the dictum "scripture equated a woman to a man for all
the laws in the Torah,, 21 5 recognizing the woman as an independent
legal agent, with the capacity and power to perform acquisitions and
to assume undertakings, at her discretion.26
In Christian-Moslem society of the medieval period the husband
was entitled to hit his wife and to force her to accept his authority.217 In
fact, wife beating by their husbands in medieval society was an accepted
social norm, and usually the legal systems didn't intervene to change this
norm.2 18 Unfortunately, physical and emotional abuse of wives by their
husbands is also frequently mentioned in Jewish sources of the Geniza
and in the various branches of halakhic literature, attesting to the
frequency of the phenomenon, and the degree to which it cast its shadow
over the institute of marriage. 9 Sources indicate that it affected a
number of societal groups, not being limited to indigent classes alone.22 °
Jewish scholars fiercely combated the blight throughout the generations,
albeit with only partial success.
This section will examine the sources of Jewish law, and elaborate
on the measures adopted for dealing with abusive husbands. First, in
the context of spousal abuse, Jewish law did not generally distinguish
between physical abuse and psychological or emotional abuse. Quite
the opposite: In certain cases halakhic authorities ascribed greater
gravity to emotional abuse than to physical abuse. This is one of the
214. In this issue (especially regarding Jewish family law), see YEDIDYA COHEN,
TAKKANOT OF THE SAGES IN SPOUSAL PROPERTY RELATIONS 30-31 (1996).
215. In the Mechilta d'Rashbi, Epstein-Malamed ed. 158 (1956).
216. COHEN, supra note 214.
217. See AVRAHAM GROSSMAN, HASSIDUT U'MORDUT 375ff (2001). Numerous
municipal constitutions specifically permitted husbands to be violent towards their
wives. See SHLOMIT SHACHAR, HAMA'MAD HA-REVI'I - HA-ISHA BIMEI HABEINAIM
86 (1991).
218. Id at 397.
219. Id. at 373.
220. Id.
221. Id. at 373. See also id. at 373-97.
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anchors for what we regard as an appropriate point of departure for
dealing with abuse in common law too.
Finally, it hardly warrants mention that the sources cited below
are for the most part applicable to the wife's abuse of the husbands as
well; however our discussion focuses on the more frequent situation
of the abusive husband.
B. Prohibition of Abusing a Spouse - Sources and Foundations
1. The Husband's duty to Honor his Wife
Jewish law recognizes a number of relationships premised on the
duty of honoring, including the general attitude towards women. 2
However, special importance attaches to the husband's duty to honor
his wife, and as stated in the Talmud: "A man should always be
careful about his wife's honor, for blessing is found in a man's house
only on account of his wife. ' 23 The husband was also admonished not
to cause grief to his wife, as Rav said: "One should always be heedful
of wronging his wife, for since her tears are frequent she is quickly
hurt. 2 2 4 The Talmud further states that the ideal husband is: "the
man who loves his wife as himself, and honors her more than
himself., 25 Maimonides (twelfth century) gives this dictum normative
halakhic expression:
Therefore the Sages laid down that a man shall honor his wife more
than his own self and shall love her as he loves himself, and shall
constantly seek to benefit her according to his means, and he
should not intimidate her, and he shall speak gently with her; that
he should be neither sad nor irritable.226
These duties of the husband to his wife are also expressed in the
halakhic literature.227 In fact, Prof. Menachem Elon emphasized that
the husband's duty to honor his wife more than his own body "is an
expression with overwhelming halakhic - legal implications, for which
I have found no parallel in any of other philosophical and legal
system, be it those of ancient times, and even those of far more
222. See e.g., b.Shevuot, 30a.
223. b.Bava Mezia, 59a, comments of R. Helbo.
224. b.Bava Mezia, 59a.
225. b. Yebb. 62b.
226. Hil. Ishut, 15.19.
227. See Shulkhan Arukh. Khoshen Mishpat, 228.3; Shulkhan Arukh Harav, (R. S.Z
of Laadi), Hilkhot Onaah ve-Genevat Da'at, 32.
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contemporary periods." '228 The husband's special duty towards his
wife figures prominently in the sages' attitude to the subject of a
husband's abuse of his wife as well.
2. The Scope of the Prohibition of SpousalAbuse
Striking a person other than in the framework of punishment by
a court is biblically proscribed.2 9 In fact, the sages took a particularly
harsh view of even raising a hand against someone without actually
hitting him,23° which is especially true in the domestic context of a
husband abusing his wife. Not only bodily damage is prohibited,
leading to civil and criminal sanctions; emotional abuse that causes
the woman grief and degradation is similarly proscribed. This point
was stressed by one of the halakhic authorities, who wrote that "no
offender commits as grave an offense against rabbinic enactments as
the man who beats and degrades his wife, for the rabbis' enactment
was that a man may not beat his wife and is obligated to respect her
dignity, 23 1 In fact, in a case in which a man emotionally abused his
wife until she lost her will to live, though no mention is made of his
having struck her, it nonetheless states that "this is worse than
death., 23 2  Indeed, in many cases, the emotional harm is more
damaging to the woman than the physical harm.
Finally, it bears emphasis that the prohibition of abusing a wife
and offending her dignity, also includes the prohibition of forcing
marital relations on her against her will,233 a point already made by
Maimonides, who wrote that the woman is "not his slave to be
compelled to have intercourse with someone she hates., 234 Based on
this approach of Jewish law, the Israeli Supreme Court ruled that the
228. ELON, supra note 20, at 34. For an extensive discussion of these facts and
their halakhiclegal ramifications, see id. at 194ff.
229. See Deuteronomy25:3. Maimonides, Hilt Hovel UMazik, 8.1. For discussion
of the prohibition on assaulting and injuring, see generally ENCYCLOPEDIA
TALMUDIT, 12, 679ff (entry on Hovel), and R. Zalman & N. Goldberg, Prohibition of
Assault andDuty ofPayment, 1 SHAAREI ZEDEK 57 (2000).
230. "He who raises his hand against his friend, even though he did not strike him,
is called wicked." b.Sanh., 58b.
231. Resp. Binyamin Zeev, 88.
232. Resp. Tashbetz, 2.8.
233. b.Erub, 100b; Maimonides, Hil. Issurei Biab, 21.12, and Hil. Ishut, 15.17;
Shulkhan Arukh, Even Haezer, 28.2. See Nachum Rakover, Coercive Marital
Relations Between a Man and His Wife, 6-7 SHENATON HA-MISHPAT HA-IVRI 295-
317 (1979-80).
234. Maim. Hillshut, 14.8.
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offense under section 345 of the Israeli Penal law, dealing with
"unlawful intercourse," also refers to relations between a man and his
wife, in divergence from the traditional position of English law.235 We
therefore conclude that Jewish law gives expression to all of the
elements normally subsumed in the offense of abuse: physical,
emotional, and sexual.
3. Stringency against Husband who Abuses his Wife
Halakhic scholars over the generations ascribed particular gravity
to the acts of husbands who adopted physical and emotional violence
against their wives. Rashba, a leading Spanish scholar in the
fourteenth century, succinctly expressed the exceptional severity of a
wife-beating husband:
It is forbidden for a husband to strike [i.e. physical abuse], and to
torment [i.e. emotional abuse] his wife ... for she must live with
him and not grieve with him. Quite the opposite - he must honor
her more than himself... and I tend to think that if it is publicly
known that he beats her in contradiction of what is becoming to
worthy daughters of Israel .... He should divorce her with a
kettubah [i.e. a Jewish marriage contract], because he locks the
door before her.236
The halakhic codifiers adopted a similar view. In R. Moses
Isserles (sixteenth century) glosses on the Shulkhan Arukh, he
mandates that:
The man who beats his wife transgresses the same prohibition as he
who assaults his neighbor, and if he does it habitually, the rabbinical
court should afflict him and excommunicate him, and whip him in
all the methods of compulsion and coercion, because this is not the
237custom of Jewish people for men to beat their wives.
The halakhic codifiers dealt primarily with the implications of a
husband's violence towards his wife regarding the possibility of
forcing him, or at least obligating him to give her a get (Jewish
divorce), 38 but their rulings express their fundamental approach
235. See CrimA 91/80 Cohen v. Israel [1982] IsrSC 35(3) 280, 281-294. For
elaboration, see ELON, supra note 20, at 216-28.
236. Resp. Rashba (attributed to Nahmanides), 102.
237. Shulkhan Arukh, Even Haezer, 154:3.
238. For extensive discussion of this topic, see Eliav Shochetman, Violence
Against Women as Grounds for Divorce, JUBILEE VOLUME IN NAME OF MENACHEM
ELON (forthcoming 2008); Mordechai Frishtik, Physical Violence against Women as
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towards abuse of women.
In Darchei Mosce9 R. Moses Isserles cites Maharam of
Rothenburg, who wrote: "Stringency should be applied to a man who
beats his wife, for it is a heinous offense, and it is not the custom of
our nation to behave in this way to their wives. ' '21 One of the leading
Ashkenazi scholars of the thirteenth century, Maharam, discusses the
case of a husband who "habitually beat his wife, and she begged him
not to beat her any more, but he refused to promise and would not
accept. 24 1 Maharam stressed the husband's duty to honor his wife,
which is expressed in the phrase "for life and not sorrow. 2" 2
According to Maharam the man who beats his wife should be treated
with more severity than the regular cases of assault, by force of his
duty to honor her more than himself.2 43 Maharam further proves from
the Talmud that the husband is enjoined from beating his wife even if
she falls into the category of a "bad wife. 2" Maharam thus
constructed an impenetrable fortress protecting the woman from the
heavy hand of her husband, and the other important rabbinic
authorities concurred with him.245 The prohibition against a husband
beating his wife was broad, and a husband is not even permitted to
beat a "bad wife."
In another version of Maharam's responsum it emerges that his
ruling belongs to the halakhic tradition of German rabbinic authorities
who preceded him,246 and which also continued after him. One of his
Grounds for Receiving Get in Jewish Law and Rabbinical Jurisdiction, 17 DINEI
YISRAEL 93 (1993). See also ENCYCLOPEDIA TALMUDIT, 6, 418, (s.v. "Gerushin");
Ben-Zion Scherschewsky, DINEI MISHPAHA (FAMILY LAWS) 306-07 (4th expanded
version, 1993).
239. See Tur, Even Haezer, 154:16.
240. Id.
241. Resp. Maharam ofRothenburg, Krimona Ed. 291.
242. Id
243. This is the wording of Maharam of Rothenburg, Prag.Ed. This conception
was widely accepted among Ashkenazic authorities of the medieval period, and was
also accepted as binding halakhah. There is one exceptional, minority opinion in of
the Babylonian Gaonim, which left no impression in classic halakhah, to the effect
that the act of striking a wife by the husband should not be regarded with the same
severity as when a stranger strikes his wife because the husband has "ownership"
over his wife. Id. at 927. See responsum of the Gaonim, ShaareiZedek, part 4. 1.4.
244. Id
245. See Maharshal, Yam ShelShlomo, b. kama 3:21.
246. Resp. Maharam of Rothenburg, Prague Ed. 91.
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students, R. Alexander Zusslin Hacohen (fourteenth century), writes247
that:
[T]he Gedolim (Rabbis) were particularly strict with a husband
who beats his wife.... He must give her guarantees that he will not
strike her again, and if he refuses to guarantee, he must divorce her
and give a kettubah. And they dealt with the issue at length and
were extremely strict on the matter.248
A similar conception, emphasizing the particular gravity of wife
abuse, is also evidenced from the words of other important halakhic
authorities. 249  The conclusion is therefore that greater severity
attaches to wife abuse than to regular cases of assault and abuse, and
the severity stems from the nature of the spousal relationship.
Indeed, many rabbinic authorities emphasized the special nature of
the spousal relationship as the factor that aggravates the harm
inflicted by the husband who abuses his wife, for "she lives with him
in peace and her tears are near., 250 In other words, a woman should
feel secure in her and her husband's home, and hence is particularly
sensitive if the person harming her is her husband.
C Spousal Abuse in Jewish Tort Law
1. Liability in Tort
There is no explicit Scriptural reference to a husband who is violent
towards his wife, but under Talmudic law, where a man wounds his wife,
the rabbinical court confiscates a certain part of his property, and
purchases land with it, which subsequently becomes the wife's private
property, even though the husband is permitted to benefit from the
proceeds from the land.25 ' This payment is effectively a substantial fine,
247. R. Alexander Zusslin Hacohen, SeferHa-Aguda, Kettubot, 172.
248. See also Resp. Perach Mateh Aharon, 1:60. In recent years, the Israeli
Supreme Court relied on Maharam's responsum when dismissing the appeal of a man
sentenced to five years of prison (four to be actually served), for having struck his
wife and severely injuring her. The Court ruled that under the circumstances "the
consideration of deterrence of the appellant and deterring other potential criminals
from beating their wives, and performing horrendous acts such as those committed by
the appellant - leads us to the conclusion that the appellant's punishment was by no
means overly harsh." Crim.A 92/2157 Fadida v. State of Israel [1983] 47(1) IsrSC 81,
85-88. This topic is elaborated in ELON, STATUS OF WOMEN, supra note 20, at 196-
201.
249. For more sources, see ENCYCLOPEDIA TALMUDIT, 12, 680-81ff.
250. OrZarua, BavaKammal6l.
251. Tosefta, Bava Kamma 9:14, 45 (Lieberman ed.).
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and the very fact that the husband is permitted to benefit from the profit
does not diminish its significance as a fine on the husband. This
Talmudic ruling indicates that rabbinic law viewed wife beating not only
as a criminal offense, but also as giving rise to liability in tort.
The Babylonian Talmud 2 cites a question that Rabba Bar Nathan
asked R. Huna (250-290 C.E.): What is the law applying to a man who
injures his wife in the course of conjugal intercourse? The Talmud
rephrases the question even more specifically: "Since he performed this
act with full permission is he to be exempt [for damage resulting there
from], or should perhaps greater care have been taken by him?, 253 The
Talmud concludes that the husband is liable for injury to his wife
occasioned by sexual intercourse, despite its consensual nature, and even
though they both enjoyed themselves."' The husband's liability derives
from the fact that he committed a physical act that caused her damage,
and this was codified as the accepted rule in Jewish law. 5 At this
juncture it bears mention that medieval rabbinic authorities drew
conclusions from this passage regarding the law applying to any violent
husband: If a husband is liable for inadvertently injuring his wife while
having intercourse with her, this is the law a fortiori when the husband
attacks her intentionally, without her consent.5 6
Commentators and codifiers dealt with the questions of defining the
husband's tort, its source, and its scope.257 There are those who regarded
the damage as an act of ones (compulsion), i.e., one over which he had
no control at all; 258 others saw it as an inadvertent act - shogeg
(unintentional transgression, inadvertence). 259 However, there were also
those who regarded the husband as being a "poshea"- negligent (in
modem tort parlance).260 In defining whether the act was one of
negligence it could be argued that even though the Talmud concludes
that the husband is liable, given that he alone committed the physical act,
252. b.Bava Kamma 32a.
253. Id
254. Id.
255. See Maim. Hilt Hovel uMazik, 4:17; Shulkhan Arukh, Hoshen Mishpat,
421:12; id. Even Haezer, end of s. 83.
256. See e.g., OrZarua, PiskeiBava Kamma, 161.
257. The various views are summarized in Ozar Mefarshei HaTalmud, Bava
Kamma, 32a, 242-50.
258. Even HaEzel, Hilchot Hovel U'Mazik, 6.3 (according to the Maimonides'
approach).
259. The view of HaMeii, as cited in the Shita Mekubezzet, Bava Kamma 32a.
260. See Perush Rabbenu Hananel, and Nimmukei Yossef, on the passage in Bava
Kamma (ad loc); see also PiskeiHaRosh, Bava Kamma, 2:10.
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this is only a description of the circumstances that gave rise to the
husband's duty of care. Instead, the source of his liability lies in his
failure to take care and having caused an injury as a result.
The latter halakhic authorities were likewise perturbed by the
Talmud's conclusion that the husband who injures his wife during
sexual intercourse is liable for her damage. 61 Their concern is that
even according to the halakhic view that a person is liable for things
that occur accidentally, the person who is engaged in an action that
he is obliged to perform, for the benefit of the victim, should be
exempt from tort liability. This being the case, it is unclear how one
can obligate a person who injured his wife while having marital
relations with her, because he is doing it at her bequest and for her
pleasure, and he is even obligated to do so by the commandment of
marital relations? One explanation is that the man acting with
consent is exempt in the case of an accident only when there was no
negligence involved; but, if negligence was involved, he is liable for
damages in the same way as if he had acted intentionally. 263 Another
explanation is that a person cannot waive damages of his own body,
and that therefore a husband who injured his wife, even if acting with
her permission, and her pleasure, will be held liable6.2
2. Liability in Tort of a Husband Who Abuses his Wife and
Punitive Damages
A person who hits his neighbor incurs liability to pay for harm
caused. In this context there are five heads of torts, four of which are
quantifiable and which express the direct financial loss sustained by
the victim.
261. See Mahane Ephraim, Hilkhot Nizkei Mammon, 5.
262. See Ramban, in Milhamot, at the beginning of the third chapter of Bava
Kamma and in Shita Mekubetzet, Bava Mezia 82b, s.v ve'ata,(in the name of
Ramban), and in Shita Mekubbezet, id. 27a (in the name of a student, Rabbenu
Perez and Rav Yeshaya). See also in Mahane Ephraim, id., who derived that this was
similarly Rashi's intention.
263. See Hazon Ish, Bava Kamma 11:21; and Even HaEzel, supra note 258;
Kehilat Yaakov, Bava Kamma, 15; A vi Ezri, Hilkhot Sechirut, 3:2. See also Resp.
Maharsham,1:75.
264. Ravid HaZahav, 42:3. He further explains that this was the reason for the
Shulkhan Arukh, Hoshen Mishpat, 421:12 citing the law of the liability of a person
who injures his wife during the marital act, in the same section as the law concerning
a person who says to his friend to amputate his hand or blind his eyes, on the
condition that he will be exempt, to the effect that he is nonetheless liable for the five
heads of damage, because both laws have the same foundation, of being admitting of
a waiver.
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The Mishnah 265 enumerates the formulae for quantifying the
amount of damages: the damage (evaluation of the monetary loss
caused as a result of the victim's inability to function normally); pain
(pain and suffering); medical expenses, incapacitation (loss of work
days); and finally shame (boshet = mental anguish).2 6
A distinction can also be made between the various forms of
compensation for abuse, all of which are relevant for this issue: (1)
damages for physical abuse causing injury; (2) damages for physical
abuse where there is no injury; (3) damages for shame and emotional
harm caused as a result of harming the victim's body (boshet); and (4)
damages for pure emotional harm caused by verbal humiliation (boshet
devaim). We will now elaborate on each of these heads of tort.
First: Damages for physical abuse causing injury
According to some of the halakhic authorities,2 7 there is no
difference between compensation for torts caused by others and those
caused by her husband. 21 Similarly, an early Tannaitic source (40-200
C.E) does not draw a distinction between "[h]e who assaults his wife,
whether by himself or others who assaulted her., 269  Both
commentators and halakhic codifiers questioned the contradiction
between the wording of the Tannaitic source which makes no
distinction between assault by the husband or stranger, and the ruling
of Maimonides,270 who does distinguish between the two. In fact, the
Maimonides ruling is the source for the ruling in the authoritative
codification Shulkhan Arukh.7 Other authorities, however, argue that
Maimonides' ruling poses no problem because he too would concede
that under Talmudic law the identity of the assailant is irrelevant;
rather, his ruling was based on a Geonic regulation (seventh-tenth
century), which imposed a fine on the husband,22 and reflects the
265. Bava Kamma, 8.1.
266. Regarding the rules governing non-pecuniary damages, and their method of
calculation (in relation to the Israeli Civil Wrongs Ordinance) see AVRAHAM
SHIENFELD HOK LEYISRAEL: TORTS 303-07 (Nachum Rakover ed., 1992).
267. Hassagot HaRaavad, Hil Hovel UMazik, 4:16; Ran, Kett. 28b-29a, on the
Rif, folios, s. v. meziat.
268. Shulkhan Arukh, Even Haezer, 83:1.
269. Tosefta, Bava Kamma, 9:8 at 45 Lieberman edition.
270. Hilkhot Hovel UMazik, 4:15. For elaboration on this point, see R. Shaul
Lieberman Tosefta Kipeshutta, Bava Kamma 101-02 (1988).
271. SHULKHAN ARUKH, Supra note 268.
272. There are those who limit the extent of the Geonic ruling specifically to the
fact that the husband will not benefit from the proceeds of the part received by his
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halakhah as accepted by most latter codifiers.273
Another explanation2 11 for the differential treatment is that
payments of damage and shame must be paid in their entirety to the
woman. In the case of abuse sustained at the hands of a stranger, the
husband suffers by reason of her anguish and is distressed by her injury
and is entitled to part of the compensation; this is not the case when he
himself injured his wife, in which case he is not entitled to any part of
the compensation."' Yet another explanation276 is that this was a fine
imposed by the Geonim on the husband; under talmudic interpretation
the Rabbis made no regulation for the husband to receive payment
when he had behaved inappropriately, so that "the sinner would not
profit."277
The conclusion is that Maimonides and Shulkhan Arukh
fundamentally endorsed the ruling of the Geonim. In addition, the
Geonim's protection of the woman who was beaten by her husband,
was based not only on the fact that the violent husband is fined
according to his financial ability and property, but also because the
fine money and the damages money are given in totum to the wife,
who can use them at her discretion. 78 Another unique feature of the
fine imposed on the husband is that it is not reciprocal: When a
woman strikes her husband, she is not required to pay him his
damage, pain, and medical expenses, but rather the husband is only
allowed to deduct the damage payments from her kettubah (a Jewish
wife, but he benefits from his own part just like he would have had a stranger struck
his wife. See comments of the Rabbis referred to above, supra note 267.
273. See HelkatMehokek, Even Haezer, id. at 6.
274. That was given by the Maggid Mishneh Regarding Maimonides, supra note
270, and the Ran (in the name of Rashba), Ran, Kett. 28b, s.v. "nan."
275. Id.
276. Ritva, b.Ket 66a, s. v. "hamakif"
277. It is stressed that this explanation is accepted by all with respect to the
proceeds of payments owing to the wife at all events. See Ran, supra note 274;
Helkat Mehokek, supra note 273.
278. On this matter, Maimonides and the Shulkhan Arukh elaborated on the issue of
the wife's entitlement to money she had received from her husband, emphasizing that
"everything is hers, and the husband is not entitled to any proceeds, and if she wanted to
give the money to another, she has permission." This differs from what appears to be the
position of the Gaon, mentioned below (text of note 302) who curtailed the wife's right to
money that she received from her husband, allowing her to "use it as she pleases,
provided that she did not make a gift without him being aware of it." To be precise, it
bears mention that a different wording of the view of the Geonim (Rav Hanina and Rav
Hai) was cited in the TurEven Haezer, 424:13-15. According to the view in the Tur, the
protection given to the woman who was beaten by her husband is relatively restricted, but
the opinion was rejected as halakhah, in favor of Maimonides' view which was accepted.
[Vol. 32:1
Changing the Current Policy Towards Spousal Abuse
marriage contract) in the event of his divorcing her.279
What emerges is that acts such as hitting and slapping that causes
injury, the husband has to compensate his wife for the full damage, pain,
and mental anguish, and he must also ensure her medical recuperations
and sustenance. In cases of repeated abuse, this would also be the rule -
a fortion.
Second Damages forphysical abuse that did not lead to an
injury
This head of tort is, prima facie, more problematic than the first
category. Non-injurious physical abuse, especially of an adult person
in public, is far more an issue of insult and humiliation than the
physical pain. This was the issue at hand in the FamCcast discussed
above21 which dealt with severe and prolonged emotional abuse
stemming from acts which physically hurt another person without
actually injuring them. Despite the absence of physical injury, the
sages imposed fixed fines for harm arising out of the victim's
humiliation and emotional anguish attendant to being physically
assailed.28'
Third Damages for shame and emotional abuse caused as a
result of physical injury ("boshet")
Under this head of tort, the amount of damages is calculated in
accordance with the principle of "the status of the offender and the
offended."' The shame of a prominent person is considered greater
than that of a layman, as explained by Rashi, ad loc, "[w]here a simple
person was the offender, the offense is greater and where an important
person is offended, his offense his greater," and naturally the particular
279. See Maimonides, Hil. Hovel U-Mazik 4.18.
280. See the discussion in part II.A.3 above regarding FamC (Jerusalem) 18551/00,
supra note 64.
281. Mishnah, Bava Kamma 8.6 (author translated). See also b.Bava Kamma 27b
(author translated). The Rishonim dispute whether these sums are only awarded for
boshet or also for other heads of damage. See Rif Bava Kamma 12b, and Maggid
Mishneh, Hilkhot Hovel UMazik 3.8; Rema Shulkhan Arukh, Hoshen Mishpat, 420:43.
It bears mention that discussion of the sums of these fines and the rules governing damage
payments is conducted on a level of principle only, because on a practical level in our
times the rabbinical court has limited jurisdiction to adjudicate payment of fines. Even so,
it was ruled that for social-deterrent goals, the court is authorized to obligate husbands to
make payments, as well as impose other measures by way of punishment (Rema Hoshen
Miahpat 2:1), which is indeed justified in the context of domestic violence.
282. Shulkhan Arukh, Hoshen Misshpat, 420:24.
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circumstances of every case must be taken into account."83 As for
calculating the amount of "shame," the halakhic authorities are
divided. 4 Nevertheless, it bears emphasis that this kind of shame is only
such as is caused by harm caused to the victim's body.
Fourth: Damages for pure emotional harm caused by verbal
humiliation ("boshet devarim')
Damages under this head would compensate the wife for mental
harm sustained due to ongoing fear of and intimidation by her husband.
Her mental damage may actually be even more than her physical
damage. However, while severe and protracted domestic abuse may
lead to many kinds of emotional damages, classical Jewish law does
not recognize pure emotional damage that is not within the category
of boshet - the shame sustained as a result of physical injury. A
person who humiliates or degrades another transgresses a negative
commandment of Biblical standing, 85 but this does not render him
liable under tort.
Despite the Talmudic exemption under tort given to a person
who verbally insults another,"' a number of halakhic authorities have
ruled that while the verbal offender is exempt, the court is authorized
to enact regulations as a matter of public policy. This is quite
different from the situation in the United States. Indeed, many
Jewish communities imposed fines upon those who insulted others,
calculated according to the dignity of the offender and the offended."7
Throughout the generations various methods were employed for
dealing with this kind of serious offence, "for verbal degradation is
worse than the degradation caused by physical injury, for nothing is as
abhorrent as the slander that a person speaks about his fellow
283. See e.g., Sema Hoshen Mishpat; id., s. 25.
284. According to Maimonides, Hil. Naara Bethula 2.5, estimation is made of how
much money would have been given by the victim in order to avoid being shamed by that
particular person. According to Ramah (his comments are cited in the Shita
Mekubbetzet Ba va Kamma 83b), the calculation is based on how much a similar person
would have been prepared to take in return for being shamed by that particular person.
Here, a distinction is made between ongoing degradation and one time embarrassment.
See SHEINFELD, supra note 266, at 306.
285. See Shulkhan Arukh, Hoshen Mishpat, 228: 1-5.
286. b.Bava Kamma 91a.
287. Maimonides, Hilkhot Hovel UMazik 3:5; Resp. Rosh, 101:1; Shulkhan
Arukh, Hoshen Misbpatr, 420:38; Pithei Teshuva ad loc. ss. 8 and in many others, as
noted by SHEINFELD, supra note 266.
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man."'  In this context, we will present just some of the sources
dealing with the matter. Maimonides writes: "And the rabbinical
court should create a fence at all places and all times as it deems
fit." 289 In other words, it is incumbent upon the courts to eliminate
this kind of occurrence, and it has the discretion to adopt measures to
that effect. 2' R. Sherira Gaon (tenth century) wrote:29' "he who
humiliates his neighbor by words (according to some versions -
publicly humiliates) is excommunicated until he pacifies the offended
person." In other words, extensive social pressure was applied on the
offender to appease his neighbor monetarily. 29 According to Rosh
(fourteenth century),
The practice of many Jewish communities is to enact regulations
and build protective barriers against those with sharp tongues and
to fine those who insult others, all as the circumstances require, and
the court should act as appropriate, according to the stature of the
offender and the offended.93
In certain cases the court exercised its discretion and imposed
monetary punishments for verbal humiliation.294 In the responsum of
Havot Yair (seventeenth century), he states that even though Talmudic
law exempts the person who verbally insults another,
at all events, in this matter custom overrides the halakhah, and it
has been accepted by the entire community of Israel to impose a
monetary fine in this kind of matter, in accordance with the
circumstances.., and if God forbid this is not done, disputes will
multiply in Israel, and each man will devour his neighbor.
Based on these precedents, the modern Israeli Rabbinical
Court296 drew the following conclusions: (a) There is a Geonic
enactment that a person who insults his friend is excommunicated
until properly appeased;2" (b) the court has the discretion to impose
288. Piskei HaRosh Bava Kamma 8.15.
289. Maimonides, Hilkhot Hovel UMazik, 3.7.
290. TurHoshen Mishpat, 420.
291. Teshu vat HaGaonim, Shaarei Teshuva, 8.
292. And not just words of appeasement. See Sema Hoshen Mishpat, 1:23.
293. Resp. Rosh, 101:9. These comments were also cited as binding halakhah in Resp.
Bach (hayeshanot), 109; Resp. Divrei Ribot, 117.
294. See also, Rav. Zvi Lipshitz, Compensation for Verbal Humilitation, 16
TEHUMIN 381 (1996).
295. Resp. Ha vot Yair, 62.
296. 5 P.D.R. at 322.
297. Id.
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monetary payments, according to the circumstances (time, place) and
the stature of the offender and the offended.298 It was also stated in
the Jerusalem Rabbinical court judgments:
Even though the court does not have the authority to obligate the
defendant for shame and emotional damage, it is able to prevail
over him in such matters by a variety of means, and if he does not
settle with the plaintiff, the plaintiff is entitled to request that the
court impose sanctions on the defendant, including payment for the
shame and emotional damage' 9
Thus the husband may be held liable under tort law not only for
physical injury, but also for acts of emotional abuse which amount to
humiliation and degradation. In addition, the judge has discretion
over which sanction to impose on the tortfeasor in accordance with
the gravity of his acts, the deterrence factor, and public policy in the
distressing issue of domestic violence.
It further bears mention that even though emotional harm (e.g.,
anxiety and depression) alone does not provide grounds for tort
liability, it apparently provides evidence of the intensity of
degradation and insult experienced by the woman. As such,
emotional harm should be considered when assessing the rate of
damages, at least for the actual act of abuse. In our view, this is the
implication of the rulings of both Maimonides and Rosh, who stated
that the sanction should fit the circumstances surrounding the act of
damage and thus recognize the severity of the suffering.
Can a wife-abusing husband be subjected to punitive damages
over and beyond regular tort compensatory damages? Whereas the
purpose of compensatory damages in tort is to restore the victim to
his/her pre-tort condition, i.e., before the occurrence of the injury, the
purpose of punitive damages is to punish the tortfeasor for his
despicable conduct and to deter future similar conduct. As a matter
of general judicial policy, Jewish law regards punitive damages as an
exception, and in this sense conforms to the common law that awards
punitive damages only for particularly diabolical and repulsive acts,
especially those evidencing malice.3°° Whether punitive damages may
298. 5 P.D.R. at 322.
299. Jerusalem rulings in monetary matters and explanations of Jewish subjects,
pt. 3 at 205; concededly, the last case concerned the cancellation of shidduchin, in
which the sum of the fine was determined in advance, but the general principles can
be inferred from the judgment.
300. For elaboration on this issue, see our discussion above, especially in chapter
III part A.
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be imposed for spousal abuse will be discussed in the context of the
sanctions imposed by Jewish authorities over the generations against
wife-abusing husbands.
The option of imposing punitive damages on an abusive husband
was recognized as early as the Geonic period (seventh-tenth century).
Notably, while the Geonim of Babylonia totally denied the husband
any right to hit his wife, their responsa attest to different views on the
matter.' In an anonymous responsa, one Gaon was asked about the
law of a person who hit his wife and inflicted severe wounds.", Despite
its brevity, four important principles were derived from the Gaon's
response. (1) The assailant should be fined for damages according to his
ability and assets; i.e., the damages are not limited to real damage caused
to the wife, rather they include punitive damages. The problem here is
that the particular case concerned a man who hit his wife, wounding and
bruising her. Arguably, had the woman suffered less, or remained
physically unharmed, the authorities might have excluded punitive
damages and only fined the husband for the actual damage. The
language of the responsa is not instructive on this. (2) The damages are
given solely to the woman who is free to use it at her discretion.
Apparently the husband is not entitled to use the money that he paid to
his wife. (3) The court should "make a compromise between them." In
other words, the court should make efforts not to exacerbate the family
dispute and endeavor to bring the parties to a compromise and domestic
peace. (4) Finally, wife beating is not considered sufficient grounds for
compelling a get.303
Other Geonic responsa indicate the sanction of supplementing
the sum of the kettuba that the husband must pay to his wife as
compensation for his violence towards her.3 ° Punitive damages are
mentioned extensively in halakhic literature, along with other sanctions
that rabbinic authorities customarily imposed on abusive husbands
throughout the generations (and not only during the Geonic period).
These will be discussed in the following chapter.
301. See GROSSMAN, supra note 217, at 379-80.
302. See Otzar Ha-Gaonim, Kettubot, responsa section, no. 477, which is based on the
responsa of the Gaonim, Nathan Koronil, no. 44.
303. Also in another version of the Gaon's responsum (also cited in the responsa
of the Gaonim). Id. Its source is the Short Responsa of the Gaonim, no.135, where
he mentions briefly that "we fine him according to his financial standing and his
assets, but he is not coerced into giving a divorce." We will discuss the issue of
forcing a get at length below.
304. See Resp, Gaonim, Shaarei Tzedek, part 4. § 1. 13;id. § 4.
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D. Spousal Abuse in Jewish Criminal Law and Societal Sanctions
1. Penal Sanctions
Apart from the court's authority to impose damages for injuries
sustained by the wife as discussed above, the custodians of social
order, such as legislators, judges and rabbis, are likewise authorized
to adopt additional measures, both penal and deterrent (by
appropriate legislation, appropriate criminal sentencing by the court
and its enforcement).
As we observed above, the wife abuser may be fined in
accordance with his ability and assets. Stringent policies against wife
abusers were part of the policy adopted by Rabbenu Simcha of
Shapira, an Ashkenazic Rabbi of the twelfth century, and subject to
certain changes, his rulings served as a precedent in the rulings of
numerous halakhic authorities. We will examine his comments as cited
by his student R. Yitzhak Medinna,305 whose responsum begins with his
conclusion "that it is forbidden for a man to strike his wife, and he is
liable for her damages if he injured her. And if he beat her
repeatedly in public, he is forced to divorce her."3'06 Following this, the
author cites the responsum of R. Simcha. Rabbenu Simcha dealt with
a case of physical abuse ("frequently beats his wife") and emotional
abuse ("degrades her by uncovering her hair," in contrast to the
Jewish tradition that a married woman covers her hair).3°7 He begins
with the emphasis of the severity of the prohibition of beating a
woman, which contravenes "Jewish custom."30 8  Like the Jewish
authorities who followed him, some of whom were cited above, he
stresses that the punishment of the abusive husband is "graver than
that of a man who strikes his fellow man," due to the severe violation
of the intimate spousal bond, at a time when "she lives with him in
peace and her tears are near." Thus, in principle he is liable for her
damages.3°9 However, Rabbenu Simcha did not leave the issue
exclusively within the realm of tort. He goes further and suggests a
number of penal methods for dealing with a husband who regularly
beats his wife.
Rabbenu Simcha distinguishes between the past and the future.
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Regarding past violence, he emphasizes that the husband should be
severely fined, whether on his body or his assets, for hist • 310
transgression. In other words, punitive or aggravated damages
should be imposed, as well as corporal punishments. However, this is
insufficient for one cannot guarantee that in future the husband will
not persist in beating his wife. Accordingly, he rules that "they were
particularly harsh with him with regards to the future in whatever
form they found necessary so that he would be considered to have
already been warned, from hereon in."3"' It seems that his intention
was to create a form of conditional punishment. Rabbenu Simcha
then continues with an enumeration of the sanctions in the area of
family law.312 Here greater caution is required to avoid a hasty
dissolution of family unit where the possibility exists of bringing
about domestic peace with the couple's reconciliation; a topic to be
dealt with at length in the following chapter.
Penal sanctions were imposed not only for physical abuse.
Jewish authorities imposed fines and penal sanctions for emotional
abuse as well. For example, according to the Mordehai (thirteenth
century),313 "he who persecutes (intimidates) his neighbor with words is
subjected to stripes, for he transgresses the prohibition of 'Ye shall not
oppress one another' 31 4 regarding which Beth Yosef3 "5 wrote; the
intention is "lashes for rebelling against rabbinic law." '316 The Mordehai's
view was codified as the accepted rule in the Shulkhan Arukh:
If he spat at his friend, he is liable, but if he spat on his clothes, or
verbally abused him, he is exempt. But the rabbinical court at all
places and all times has the authority to create fences at its
discretion. Certain authorities ruled that that the husband is
excommunicated until he appeases the person he humiliated.
Haga: [Rema's glosses on Shulkhan Arukh]: and there are those




313. Hamordecha Bava Metzia 306.
314. Levit. 25:17.
315. Beth YosefHoshen Mishpat, 1.
316. Since our tradition is (b.Shabbuoth, 21a) that any negative commandment
that does not involve an action, is not punishable by lashes under Torah law, apart
from he who swears, an apostate, and he who curses his friend using the Name.
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slanders his neighbor, is considered as one who verbally
humiliates.317
We can similarly rely on the broad principle established by Ran
(fourteenth century).38 Thus, in the criminal realm the governmental
authorities are invested with extra-legal emergency powers to deviate
from the law of the Torah, by enacting laws dictated by public policy
and enforcing them by a variety of methods.318
A far broader penal perspective is evidenced in the rulings of
Maharam of Rothenberg, the leading Ashkenazi authority in the
thirteenth century, who elaborated and expanded the rulings of
Rabbenu Simcha.32° Maharam enumerates a long and varied list of
sanctions that may be imposed on wife-abusing husbands "to
excommunicate him and to whip and to administer different forms of
punishment, and even to cut off his hands if he practices it
repeatedly."32' Maharam asserted that there was authority to
administer punishment despite the generally accepted principle that
the Rabbis lost their authority for criminal adjudication following the
destruction of the Temple, the abrogation of Rabbinic ordination and
the laws of fines.322 His basis was the principle that there is permission
"to punish and whip to ensure that the matter not be treated
lightly.
323
The comments of Rabbenu Simcha and Maharam of Rothenburg
were concurred with by many medieval thirteenth-fourteenth century
authorities,324 and were codified as the accepted rule by the two
preeminent authorities of the sixteenth century: R. Yosef Karo and
R. Mosses Isserles 25 Rashba's (fourteenth century) responsum
317. Shulkhan Arukh, Hoshen Mishpat, 420:38.
318. DerashotHaRan, chapter 11.
319. See also in the book of RAV SHAUL YISRAELI, AMUD HAYEMINI 9.




324. Rabbenu Simcha's responsum is cited by his student Rabbi Yitzhak of
Vienna, the author of Or Zarua in PiskeiBava Kamma no.161. It is similarly cited in
Asheri's glosses on Bava Kamma, Ch.2 no.10, and also in the response of Maharam
Rothenburg, Prague ed. 81; id. at no. 927; See also Rabbenu Yerucham, Meysharim,
23: 5 (58b).
325. Rema cites Rabbenu Simcha in his Darchei Moshe, Eeven Haezer, 154.2. In
that context, R. Karo, the Beth Yosef, is equivocal on the issue of whether the
responsum of Rabbenu Simcha can be relied on for purposes of coercing a get.
However, all are agreed that his comments regarding fines and other punishments
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indicates that domestic violence was a problem and provided cause
for concern among rabbinic leaders of Spain and France.3 26 They
were thus vested with extensive authority to adjudicate these matters
and to punish abusive husbands, "according to the place, the time, the
people concerned, and this is the practice in our country, according to
the instructions of the leaders and Rabbinical authorities of
France."327
Also worthy of mention are the various sentencing considerations
operative in Jewish law. For example, a distinction is made between a
one time assault and recurring violence. Radbaz (sixteenth century)
3 2
states that "if he hits her frequentlyhe should be punished." Arguably
one would not impose the same degree of punishment for one time
violence, but in the specific context of spousal abuse the violence
usually ongoing and protracted. Another consideration is that where
there is a possibility of reconciling the spouses, the judges should be
wary of being overly hasty when subjecting the husband to the required
punishment.29 This consideration is reminiscent of the consideration of
the harmony of the family unit referred to in American case law.33
Finally, we note the comments of R. Chaim Falagi,33 who wrote
that there was no permission for the husband to strike his wife, and if
he did so the Rabbinical court "was obliged to lash him and
excommunicate him and to punish him." The court had no discretion
and thus was not authorized to exempt him from punishment.
2. Societal Sanctions
Many rabbinic authorities mentioned societal sanctions for
punishing abusive husbands. For example, a responsum of
Maharshakh deals with Reuven who degraded the dignity of his wife,
Rachel, and repeatedly beat her though she had done nothing
wrong.32 The rabbis subjected him to a decree of excommunication,
ban, and curse, on the pain of which he was warned not to raise his
hand against his wife; she could be relied upon to testify as to whether
have been accepted as binding halakhah.
326. Resp. Rashba, 5:274.
327. Id.
328. Resp. Radbaz, 3:447.
329. E.g., Resp. Rashba, 5:274.
330. See supra ch. 2, § (1)a.
331. R. Chaim Falagi, TOCHEHAT HAYIM, Emor, s.v. "ve-od nireh. " Rav Palgi
lived in Turkey, 1788-1869.
332. Resp. Maharshach, 2:130, s. v. "Omar ki"
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he had beaten her, thereby violating the rabbinic decree.333 A
responsum of Binyamin Zeev (sixteenth century)13 makes it clear that
the societal sanction of excommunication was particularly
appropriate for the offense of spousal abuse, and is preferable to the
forced breaking up of the family unit.35
In sum, due to the special relations between a man and his wife,
spousal abuse is of greater severity than the abuse of another person.
The additional severity not only justifies payment of punitive damages
to the wife and prevention of the husband deriving any benefit
therefrom, it also extends to punishment of the husband in various
forms, such as excommunication, execration, imprisonment, and even
graver forms of corporal punishment.
The sources cited thus far only relate to cases of spousal abuse.
However, halakhic authorities imposed extra-legal sanctions for
physical violence in general. 36 The sources indicate that despite the
general proscription of monetary punishments for general acts of
physical violence, it was incumbent on the leaders of each generation
to establish stable social institutions, by way of severe sentencing for
pernicious deeds.
E. Spousal Abuse in Jewish Family Law
Religious Jewish family law, unlike modern secular family law,
requires in principle, as part of the divorce (get) procedure, the
voluntary participation of both husband and wife. Divorce in Jewish
law is an act of the parties, authorized by the religious Rabbinical
court, not an act of the court itself.337 Also, there is a list of legal
grounds for coercion of a get (in the Mishnah and Talmud).338 The
issue that we will address in the second sub-section is whether this is a
closed list, or if further grounds may be added. In this context,
particular importance attaches to the possibility of compelling a get in
333. Id. A similar practice is mentioned in Resp. Raanah, 42.
334. Resp.Binyamin Zccv, 88.
335. See below at § 5.
336. See Rav Naftali Bar Ilan, Testimony in Court Concerning a Road Accident,
10 TEHUMIN 184 (1989).
337. It is particularly difficult to affect a divorce where the husband refuses to
participate. The wife is then termed "agunah" ("chained") and is unable to enter
into a subsequent religious marriage during the lifetime of the husband refusing her a
divorce. If she obtains a civil divorce, and remarries civilly, that latter marriage is not
recognized by Jewish religious law.
338. b. Ketubot77a.
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cases of physical or emotional abuse on the husband's part. These
rules have great importance in the modern State of Israel. Alongside
the regular civil court hierarchy in Israel, there exists also a separate
system of religious courts that are competent to adjudicate in matters
of personal status affecting members of their respective religious
communities!" As for the Jews in Israel, section 1 of the Rabbinical
Courts Jurisdiction (Marriage and Divorce) Law of 1953 reads as
follows: "Matters of marriage and divorce of Jews in Israel, being
nationals of residents of the state, shall be under the exclusive
jurisdiction of Rabbinical Courts" which rules according to the
Religious Jewish family law. Many Jews in the Diaspora also
voluntarily go the private Rabbinical Courts.
1. Separation of the Couple (Restraining Order)
The second half of the thirteenth century was a period of extensive
legislative activity in the Jewish Diaspora, finding expression, inter alia,
in a series of enactments in the realm of family law? °  These
enactments were initiated by Maharam of Rothenburg in Germany,
and by Rabbenu Perez b. Elijah of Corbeil in France. We have
previously noted the sharp measures adopted by Maharam of
Rothenburg against violent husbands. We also know that Rabbenu
Perez imposed a ban on a husband who strikes his wife, and his
enactment 34' provided that a woman who leaves the husband's, home
because of his wrongful behavior toward her is entitled to support,
calculated in accordance with her social standing and the customary
allowance of women of her town.
But first, a few introductory remarks about the halakhic
background of Rabbenu Perez's regulation. Under Jewish law, a
woman who voluntarily leaves the marital home to live separately
from her husband forfeits her entitlement to maintenance.32
Rabbenu Perez's regulation recognized an abused wife's continued
entitlement, despite the fact that she no longer resided with her
husband, since the separation was the result of the husband's conduct;
339. See Menashe Shava, SELECTED TOPICS IN FAMILY AND PRIVATE
INTERNATIONAL LAW 197 (2000).
340. See Menachen Elon, JEWISH LAW, HISTORY, SOURCES, PRINCIPLES 789-90
(1994).
341. Id. (citing Louis Finkelstein, JEWISH SELF GOVERNMENT IN THE MIDDLE
AGES (1972)).
342. Scheschewsky, supra note 238, at 130.
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thus it was as though the husband had left his wife and gone abroad. 3
Rabbenu Perez's enactment consists of two elements. First, at the
request of the wife or her relatives, the husband is required to swear,
under the penalty of a ban, not to strike his wife.' 4 The enactment
was a far reaching one, because, in the event the woman feared her
husband may hit her, it meant taking measures against the husband
even before any beating had occurred. As such, the oath was a form
of a threat and an admonishment. In other words, if the husband hit
his wife, he would be subject to the ban, and as such it had a
preventative aspect. Second, if the husband refuses to subject himself
to the ban, the wife is entitled to maintenance.
The wife's right to leave the joint matrimonial home without
waiving her right to her maintenance was reinforced at a later period
(fourteenth century) by Rashba.3 45 Rashba dealt with cases of spousal
abuse and ruled:
If the matter is known to all, she is not deemed to be a rebellious
wife (moredet) [i.e. she does not forfeit her maintenance], for he
should not behave as a lion, who causes havoc and eats, and he
beats her and has intercourse with her; and this is our practice in all
similar cases, and we do not lock her up. And this is not regarded
as rebellion because it is the result of the blows that she flees.
Rashba draws a highly instructive analogy between the husband
who beats her and then has intercourse with her, and the lion that
wreaks havoc and then eats. In other words, the husband who beats
his wife is behaving in a bestial manner.
In another responsum, Rashba elaborates on the law applying to
"a husband who beats his wife every day until she was forced to leave
home, to go to her father's house." 7  At the beginning of the
responsum, Rashba stresses the gravity of wife-beating, in contrast
with the cases of a man who strikes his neighbor, and based on such
gravity, permits the woman to leave the marital home to live
separately from her husband, "for the law is on her side, because a
person cannot be expected to live together with a snake.""38 In other
343. See Shulkan Aruch, Even Haezer, 70:12; Scheschewsky, supra note 238, at
137ff.
344. Elon, supra note 341.
345. Resp. Rashba, 4:113.
346. Id.
347. Resp. Rashba, 7:477.
348. Id.
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words, continued shared residence with the violent husband is
impossible, just as one cannot live together with a snake. As such the
wife will not be regarded as a rebellious wife if she unilaterally leaves
the marital home because of the husband's conduct.
The responsum of another important halakhic authority,
Rashbetz, states that where a judge forces a wife whose husband
aggravates her to return to her husband, as in the non-Jewish legal
systems of his times (fourteenth century), the judge should be
excommunicated. 9  This means that Jewish society guided by the
halakhah was not prepared to accord any element of legitimacy to a
woman being forced to live with a husband who is violent towards
her.35° Nor is a judge permitted to rule other than in accordance with
the law, which, as stated, does not permit coercing a woman to live with
a husband who makes her miserable.
The halakhic authorities unanimously ruled that a woman forced
to leave the marital home due to the husband's violence is not regarded
as a rebellious wife.352  Likewise, the Israeli Rabbinical Courts
recognize the right of the battered woman to leave her home without
being considered a moredet 53  In such a case, the husband would
remain liable to provide her maintenance354 because it was his fault that
the woman was forced to leave the house.355 On the other hand, the
husband's obligation only arises in circumstances in which the wife
proves her claims regarding the husband's violence. 6 If the woman
claims violence and leaves the marital home without sufficient evidence
of the husband's violence, he will not be liable for her maintenance.357
Where the woman succeeds in proving her claims of the husband's
violence, not only will she be entitled to maintenance, but she will also
be entitled to force the husband to pay for her housing costs, or to force
349. Resp. Tashbetz, 2:8.
350. Shochetman, supra note 238.
351. Id.
352. See Resp. Pnei Moshe (Benvenisti), 1:55. The entire subject is discussed by
Shochetman. Id. And the Rabbinical court judgments cited below are taken from his
article.
353. See, e.g., Appeal 1979/73, 11 PDR, at 327
354. Resp. Shoel VeNishal, 2 Even Haezer, 33 (a woman who fled her home
because of the husband's violence is entitled to receive her dowry).
355. File 1953/194 (Jerusalem), 7 PDR, at 80; Appeal 1978/121,120, published in EDUT
BIYEHOSEF - COLLECTION OF JUDGMENTS OF RABBI YOSEF KAPACH, 41, 45, at 222
(2004); Appeal 1972/94, Edut Biyehosef, id., 44; Scherschewsky, supra note 238, at 197-98.
356. See File 1-13-04198237, cited in 3 HADIN VE-HA-DAYAAN 8 (August 2003).
357. Id.
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the husband to vacate the home so she may live there alone.358 This
ruling was given by the Jerusalem Rabbinical court in an action for a
restraining order, submitted by a battered wife whose husband
repeatedly beat her and treated her violently. 9 The court obliged the
husband to pay her rent and maintenance. 36° Modern Israeli law too,
both in legislation and in case law, draws extensively upon the
provisions of Jewish law in its formulation of the laws of forcing a
husband to leave the home.36'
2. Abuse as Grounds for Coercing a Get
The central question arising in a significant portion of cases is
whether the woman, who is the victim of abuse (physical or mental)
by her husband, is entitled to request the rabbinical court to force her
husband to give her a get. 2 On this point there are a variety of
different opinions. According to Talmudic Law363 only where a get is
legally coerced is it valid. In other words, coercion is only permitted
where it has a sound legal basis, in which case the get is valid. The
legal basis is determined in accordance with the Talmudic
pronouncement of the specific circumstances in which coercion or
forcing the get is permitted." '
Physical A buse
Unfortunately, a husband's violence is not included among the
recognized Talmudic grounds for coercing a get.365 In fact, there is no
Talmudic discussion of the wife's right to demand that her abusive
husband divorce her. Rather, many halakhic authorities have ruled
3 66
358. File 1988/4306 (Jerusalem), 15 PDR, at 119.
359. Id.
360. Id. Regarding the rabbinical court's authority to issue a restraining order,
inter alia based on inappropriate conduct and violence on the husband's part, see the
rulings cited by Michael Korinaldi, The Remedy of Temporary Separation between
Husband and Wife and its Development in the Rulings of the Israeli Rabbinical
Courts, 1 SHENATON HAMISHPAT HA-IvRI 201-04 (1974). In the State of Israel the
Rabinnical Courts are authorized to issue a restraining order according to the Israeli
Family Violence Prevention Law, supra note 170.
361. See supra ch. 3 § 3.
362. This subject was recently discussed at length in a comprehensive article by
Shochetman, supra note 238.
363. b.Gittin, 88b.
364. Supra note 338.
365. See id.
366. See e.g., b.Kettubot, 77a.
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that the husband who abuses his wife has an obligation to divorce his
wife,367 and to pay her kettuba. On the other hand, many other
halakhic authorities have explicitly mentioned the option of coercing
the husband to give a get.
Obligating the husband to divorce his wife was important not
only for purposes of punishing the violent husband. It was also
important because the battered wife had the possibility of forcing her
husband to agree to a get, including appropriate financial
compensation. In light of this possibility the husband would be wary
of treating her violently, which would contribute to reducing the
frequency of abuse.36
Even Rabbenu Simcha, whose view was discussed in the previous
sections, treated the issue of coercing a get with additional caution.369
We have mentioned his adamant rulings regarding the severity of the
prohibition of wife beating and his attitude to the sanctions imposed
on the violent husband. 7 Nonetheless, in the context of imposing
sanctions in the area of family law, he stressed that great caution must
be exercised in breaking up the family, particularly if there is any
possibility of salvaging the marriage and restoring domestic harmony
between the couple. In view of this, Rabbenu Simcha suggests
establishing a trial period: "[a]nd they were ordered to live in peace
together and they would choose two or three arbitrators who would
rebuke them, and any dispute they had, they would be arbitrate
between them. ''37' However, Rabbenu Simcha did not hesitate to
adopt more stringent measures where circumstances so dictated,
especially if the attempt to restore domestic harmony failed and the
husband continued to abuse his wife. In such a case he ruled that:
If the husband did not maintain the domestic peace and continued
hitting her and degrading her, we concur with you that he should be
excommunicated in the Higher Court and the Lower Court, and
measures can be taken by the non-Jew to force him to give a get in
367. But if the husband refuses to participate, the wife is then termed "agunah"
("chained") and is unable to enter into a subsequent religious marriage during the
lifetime of the husband refusing her a divorce.
368. See Grossman, supra note 220 at 379, who added that divorces in Jewish
society were relatively frequent, and as such the woman was not concerned about a
social stigma due to her divorce, and it did not deter her from threatening the violent
husband and to actually realize her threats.
369. OrZarua, part 3. PiskeiBava Kamma, 161.
370. See supra text accompanying note 305.
371. Supra note 271.
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accordance with the instructions of a Jew.372
Rabbenu Simcha further ruled that the husband could be
excommunicated and compelled to divorce his wife, having resort to
the enforcement agencies of the non-Jewish civil authorities.373 This
represented a major innovation in Rabbenu Simcha's rulings, to the
extent that he was not perturbed by the problem of a "forced get' (get
meuseh), and could therefore rule that the violent husband should be
compelled to divorce his wife. His ruling constitutes a major precedent
in Jewish law, and served as a basis for the rulings of many great
authorities who followed him.374
Rabbenu Simcha also stressed that, even if the woman agreed to
live with a violent husband, which unfortunately was frequently the
case, it would not prevent her from demanding at a later stage that
her husband stop beating her.375 Rather, she would retain her rights
to all of the remedies granted her prior to the temporary domestic
peace."'
Another important rabbinic authority, R. Shimeon b.Zemach
Duran, the Rashbatz, a North African rabbi of the fourteenth century,
was asked regarding a husband who tormented his wife (emotional
abuse) so much so that "in her grief she rejects her husband ... and is
unable to tolerate him any longer due to his bellicosity and brawling,
and he even starves her so that she loses her will to live." '377 Under
these circumstances, even though there was no physical violence,
Rashbatz saw no problem in the fact that this was not a talmudically
recognized grounds for coercion of a get78 His view was that, under
Talmudic law, the husband could be compelled to give a get and pay
her kettubah for far less heinous conduct, such as withholding pleasure
from his wife: "all the more so in ongoing sorrow, in which case we can
rule that he should release her and pay her kettubah, because a person
need not live with a snake. '3 79 Like his predecessor, R. Simcha,
Rashbatz contended that this was an insoluble situation, because the
ongoing feud was graver than the lack of her maintenance "and what
372. Id.
373. Id.
374. See, e.g., supra note 239.
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benefit does the woman derive from her husband distressing her on a
day by day basis."3" Based on this kal vahomer (a fortiori), Rashbatz
ruled that there are grounds and authority to compel the giving of a get
because in the Talmud,"' where the smell of his mouth was unbearable
for his wife (and therefore she wanted to divorce), a husband could
justifiably be compelled to give a get.
However, while Rashbatz acknowledges the contrary opinion,
that a get cannot be forced, under these circumstances he does not
regard himself as being obliged to abide by that ruling, because
ultimately "the judge can only rely on his own personal impression,
and they may not have intended their comments for a case in which
the woman was suffering intensely." '382 This comment of Rashbatz is
particularly important today in view of the policies adopted by the
Rabbinical courts that refrain from compelling a get in deference to
the dispute between the halakhic authorities on the matter of
compulsion. The particular consideration of "the needs of the hour"
is applicable to contemporary reality. Regarding the circumstances in
which the woman is in danger due to the husband's violence, one of
the most important halakhic authorities of this generation, R. Eliezer
Waldenberg, wrote:
Under no circumstances can the woman be forced to return to live
with her husband. Quite the opposite: the husband should be
obligated to release his wife with a get pitturin because the woman
is entitled to live, and not to suffer, and how much more so is she
entitled to live and not to live with the risk of death.383
Thus, every Rabbinical court should rule in accordance with its
own discretion, and in accordance with the circumstances of the
particular case. This would certainly be the case in particularly grave
instances where the husband abuses his wife on an ongoing basis.
However, unfortunately, not all the rabbinical courts adopt this
practice; there are those who refuse to coerce a get other than in the
exceptional, extreme cases in which the woman's life is at risk.38
380. Id
381. b.Kettubot, 67a.
382. Supra note 377.
383. Resp. ZizEliezer, VI, 42.1.
384. Compare cases cited by Frishtick, supra note 238, at 100ff.
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Emotional Abuse.
Coercion of a get in the rabbinical courts has not been limited to
cases of physical violence. Rabbinical court judges have also
compelled husbands to give a get in cases of emotional abuse. For
example, in one case where there was severe emotional abuse by the
husband the Israeli Rabbinical Court of Appeals acted forcefully in
order to terminate the matter."' The case concerned a woman who
had been forced to leave her home, and had gone to live in a shelter
for battered women due to severe verbal and emotional abuse by the
husband.3 6 The matter was brought before the Jerusalem Regional
Rabbinical Court, which determined that the couple should get
divorced as soon as possible.87 In this case the Rabbinical Court of
Appeals decided that the lower court's ruling was insufficient, and in
its judgment on appeal stated that:
The truth of the woman's words is manifest, and the pain she has
expressed is genuine... emotional violence on the husband's part
is sometimes graver than physical violence. Trampling a person's
dignity, transforming him into dust and a worthless rag, is
frequently worse than physical violence ... this is a case of absolute
repulsiveness, which he (the husband) has caused, and of a life of
sorrow, pain, and humiliation. The woman is entitled to live and
not to sorrow, and the appropriate measures should be exercised
against the husband in order to procure the giving of a get.3
3. The Preferability of Penal and Civil Sanctions over Coercion
of a Get
We observed above that Rabbenu Simcha and Maharam allowed
the coercion of abusive husbands to give a get to their wives. On the
other hand, we also saw that this measure was only to be adopted as a
last option, and that it was to be preceded by penal and civil
sanctions. Many halakhic authorities did in fact oppose the extreme
measure of coercing a get, but they too supported the adoption of
stringent policies for dealing with violent husbands by resorting to penal
385. File 1-21-16788168, where the dayaanim presiding were Beth Din President,
Rav Yisrael M. Lau, and Rabbis, Shlomo Dichovsky and Shlomo M.Amar. The
judgment was published recently in 1 HADIN VEHADAYAAN 6 (2003).
386. Id.
387. Id
388.' Id. Also, see the judgment in Appeal 5754/168, 2 HADIN VEHADAYAN 3
(2003).
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and civil measures.
The policy of giving preference to civil and penal sanctions over
the coercion of a get was eloquently expressed by Rabbenu David b.
Zimra (Radbaz), one of the great rabbinical authorities of Egypt
during the sixteenth century.3"9 It was precisely Radbaz's unwillingness
to force the violent husband to give a get, which compelled him to
resort to efficient alternative measures for dealing with a violent
husband. Radbaz offers an array of sanctions ranging from the
lenient to the harsh, to be imposed with gradually increasing
severity.39° The sanctions are as follows, from the lenient to the strict:
isolation; fines in the kettubah; imposition of physical punishment by
the competent authorities in Egypt; and incarceration ("he is
imprisoned because he beat her").3 1' Radbaz emphasizes that all of
these sanctions are intended to punish the husband for having struck
her, and to prevent him from repeating his actions, but they are not
intended to force him to divorce his wife. 3' Nonetheless, Radbaz
intimates at the end of his comments that even though the violent
husband is not forced to divorce his wife, if he does so due to the
pressure of the punishments, the get will not be considered as having
been forced, and therefore invalid.393
Binyamin Zeev similarly noted, in a very long responsum,394 the
words of R. Simcha stressing the gravity of prohibition of wife
beating. After citing the authorities who express their reservation
regarding the possibility of forcing a get on the husband, he decides
that ultimately, the social sanction of degrading and social execration
of the husband is preferable to breaking up the family unit. 395 The
responsum further emphasizes that the social sanction of isolation is
particularly appropriate for the offense of wife beating.396
F. Conclusion
Without a doubt, Jewish law's model for dealing with spousal
abuse is far preferable to the common law model. It deals far more





394. Id. sec. 88.
395. Id.
396. See the comments next to supra note 334.
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comprehensively and adequately with both physical and emotional
abuse. Thus, it serves as a source of inspiration for the formulation of
the model proposed below.
Scholars of Jewish law over the generations have always rejected
the conception that was regnant for many years in common law legal
systems: granting immunity against actions instituted by spouses. In
the world of Judaism, the maxim that a man and wife "shall be as one
flesh" never served as a shield against a legal action against a spouse
who customarily beats, humiliates, and abuses his partner. Jewish law
not only espouses the establishment of relations predicated on mutual
respect between the spouses,"' but also viewed spousal abuse, physical,
emotional, or sexual, as a grave religious offense. It has also developed
a broad range of legal methods in the various realms of law for dealing
with the phenomenon, the combination of which provide maximum
protection to the spouse. This matrix of legal protection is
unparalleled, not only in ancient legal systems, but also in modern
systems. Furthermore, legal protection is supplemented by societal
sanctions, which in certain societies and communities may be of far
ranging influence, above and beyond that of regular legal sanctions.
Jewish scholars over the ages were categorically unwilling to
reconcile themselves to conjugal relations that were accompanied by
abuse, and did not hesitate to interfere in domestic affairs and impose
harsh social sanctions, even when it was liable to impair the integrity
of the family unit. They were, however, exceptionally aware of the
problems involved in interfering in spousal relations, and invariably
acted with particular sensitivity.
The model proposed in this article synthesizes various legal
responses for cases of spousal abuse, and relies largely on deeply
rooted, time-bound traditions in Jewish law. Jewish law viewed
spousal abuse as being fundamentally different from the general
abuse of another person, and the Jewish Rabbinic authorities stressed
the unique nature of the spousal connection. This connection is the
also the cause of the particular severity of a husband's violence
towards and abuse of his wife, "who lives with him in peace and her
tears are near.,
398
As such, halakhic policy regarding all cases of spousal abuse
made no distinction between physical, sexual, or even, emotional
397. "[T]he man who loves his wife as himself, and honors her more than himself."
Supra note 225.
398. Supra note 250
[Vol. 32:1
Changing the Current Policy Towards Spousal Abuse
abuse. Jewish Rabbinical authorities never questioned the husband's
liability for damage caused to his wife, even if caused innocently and
inadvertently in the course of sexual relations, which were for the
benefit and pleasure of the wife. Having established the husband's
liability for harm caused to his wife, he was obliged to compensate
her in accordance with the five heads of torts (damages, pain, medical
treatment, incapacitation, and shame). Notably, the husband was
obligated not only for physical damage, but also for acts of abuse that
involved verbal humiliation leading to exclusively emotional harm
(boshet devarim), for which the Rabbinic authorities authorized the
court "to impose monetary payment at its discretion, and according to
the circumstances (time, place) and the stature of the offender and
the offended."'39
The Jewish Rabbinical authorities also imposed punitive damages
on abusive husbands. Here the common law model is less willing to
follow a similar path. Halakhic literature does not restrict the
imposition of punitive damages to particularly severe and exceptional
cases of violence," as is the case in common law. Criminal sanctions
were also imposed on the abusive spouse, in addition to societal
sanctions. The severity of the punishment often turned on the
distinction between an isolated occurrence and recurring, and
protracted abuse.
Family law recognized the spouse's right to sue for separation
and/or exclusionary measures against the husband, such as prohibiting
him from entering or approaching the marital home. These rights are
conferred both in order to prevent the physical or emotional abuse of
the protected party, and in order to protect her (or him) where there is
a threat of the same. In cases of physical or emotional abuse many of
the Rabbinical courts have been prepared to coerce the violent
husband to give a get, although there are those that limit the permit
exclusively to the cases presenting a clear threat to the woman's life. In
all events, the accepted approach is that in cases of abuse the court
should impose civil or criminal sanctions, and only where these
measures fail should the court pursue the extreme path of actively
interfering with the spousal connection by compelling the husband to
give a get to his wife.
399. Supra note 293.
400. See, for example, R. Simcha's comments cited at the beginning of chapter 4
above.
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IV. The Proposed Model
A. An Interim Summary and the Need for a New Model
The treatment of spousal abuse in American and modern Israeli
law is not totally satisfactory. Criminal law does take physical and
sexual violence against a spouse into account, though only to a
certain, insufficient extent (there is no specific offense of spousal
abuse). Unfortunately this is not the case for emotional abuse.
In tort, the situation is slightly better. Although, generally, there is
no specific tort of spousal abuse, a civil claim may be filed based on
other existing torts. However, there are problems in both American
and Israeli law, which indicate that it would be preferable to have a
specific tort of spousal abuse. This tort should be appropriate to the
ongoing relationship and to the fact that the abuse was generally
perpetrated in the home shared by both the abuser and the victim, thus
clearly breaching the relationship of trust and intimacy between them.
For the purpose of issuing a protective order under family law,
satisfactory arrangements exist regarding physical and sexual
violence. On the other hand, emotional abuse does not serve as
grounds for issuing a protective order in some American states, and in
other states, as in Israel, such an order can only be issued for severe
emotional abuse and in extraordinary circumstances. These
differences in handling the different forms of abuse are not justified.
Thus, it is necessary to change both the legislative and judicial
policy regarding the treatment of spousal abuse. Both a specific
criminal offense and a specific tort of spousal abuse need to be
established. Consideration should also be given to the issue of
punitive or aggravated damages. Finally, flexibility needs to be
introduced into judicial rulings regarding the grant of a protective
order against emotional abuse.
Jewish law treats cases of spousal abuse in a much more satisfactory
manner, one that may be appropriately used as a source of inspiration
for the desired model proposed below. Throughout the ages, the sages
of Jewish law never accepted the idea of spousal immunity. Not only did
Jewish law espouse the idea of mutual respect between spouses, and
even saw spousal abuse - whether physical, sexual or emotional - as a
serious religious transgression, but it also developed a broad spectrum of
methods for dealing with such abuse in various legal frameworks (tort,
criminal, and family law) so as to provide maximal protection to the
spouse. Such protection is unique, not only in ancient legal systems, but
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even in modem ones. The Jewish sages never accepted that the life of a
spouse could be constantly accompanied by abuse, and they did not
hesitate to intervene in the family's affairs and impose severe sanctions,
even with when this could affect the wholeness of the family. That being
said they were well aware of the problematic nature of intervention in a
spousal relationship, and only did so' when necessary and with great
sensitivity.
The principal model to be proposed here relies to a large extent on
what has always been accepted in Jewish law: The view of spousal
abuse as something fundamentally different from abuse of any other
person. Thus, Jewish law adopted a stringent, consistent policy toward
all instances of spousal abuse, without distinguishing between physical,
sexual or emotional abuse.4'° Indeed, emotional abuse received its due
place. There was not one Jewish scholar who disputed the husband's
responsibility for damage, even unintentional damage, done to his wife.
Once the husband's responsibility for physical or emotional damage to
the wife was established, he was obligated to pay her compensation.
The Jewish sages even imposed punitive damages on husbands
who abused their wives. From Jewish legal writings, we see that the
issue of spousal abuse was a unique one, justifying, as a matter of
established judicial policy, the imposition of punitive damages. Also
punitive damages were not limited to extraordinary cases of severe
violence, '4 0 2 as is the case in modern law. Apart from this, they also
imposed on the abuser criminal and social sanctions, taking into
account considerations of penal policy (such as the distinction
between a one-time incident and ongoing abusive acts).
In the field of family law, the right of a spouse to separation and
protection from an abusive spouse was recognized, whether the abuse
was physical or emotional, or whether there was merely an
apprehension of such abuse. In cases of physical or emotional abuse,
many of the rabbinic courts did not refrain from acting in line with
the ruling that permits the court to order a violent husband to divorce
his wife, although some would refrain from this unless the case
involved actual danger to life. In any event, it is accepted that, in
instances of abuse, it is appropriate to impose civil and criminal
sanctions on the husband, and only if this does not help, would the
401. While they did distinguish between the forms of abuse they did not relegate
emotional abuse to a distinctly inferior realm.
402. See, for example, the comments of R. Simcha, discussed supra, in the text
next to note 305.
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court intervene, by compelling the husband to issue a get to his wife.
Thus, it appears that the imposition of sanctions on the abusive
husband had no bearing on the validity of the get - should it later be
given - as long as those sanctions did not relate to the refusal to issue
the get.
Of course, certain adjustments need to be made for the purposes
of modern law. As such, we propose a model composed of three
parts. The main part of this model is an attempt to improve the
existing law - American, Israeli, and any other modern legal system -
from the perspective of tort, criminal, and family law. We will
propose a number of amendments to legislation, and milestones for
use in judicial rulings, in the spirit of Jewish law, in an attempt to give
spousal abuse its own special niche.
At this point it bears emphasis that although Jewish law is
religiously grounded, most of the rules and principles of spousal
abuse can transition into a secular society. Jewish law itself makes a
fundamental distinction between "religious" (issur) and "legal"
(mammon) aspects of the Halakhah.4 °3  In the legal aspects
(mammon) the hakakhic authorities use the logic legal reasoning
(sevarah) as the major creative source of law in the area of
mammon.i Legal reasoning as a creative source of halakhic rules
involves, like in secular legal systems, an appreciation of the
characteristics of human beings in their social relationships, and a
405 id
careful study of the real world and its manifestations. In this article
we are dealing with the legal - and not religious - parts of Jewish
law.' Therefore the new model that we will propose is indeed
inspired by the ancient Jewish law model, but differs in the important
respect that it is not contingent upon specific religious teachings or
mores for its validity.
B. A Proposal for a New Tort of Spousal Abuse
We propose establishing, within modern tort law, a specific tort
of spousal abuse, based on principles drawn from Jewish law. This
tort will be independent and will not be based upon damage but
403. See Elon, supra note 202, at 122-41.
404. Id. at 137-41.
405. Id. at 987.
406. The mammon aspects of the Halakhah is, as noted by Elon, generally
corresponding to most of what is included in the corpusjuris of contemporary legal
system. Idat 141.
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rather upon behavior. It will reflect the extreme gravity of spousal
abuse, which arises as a result of the unique relationship between
husband and wife and as a result of the harm done to the abuser's
spouse.
The tort will cover all forms of abuse, including emotional abuse. In
the United States the elements of a claim for emotional damage between
spouses are: The behavior of the spouse has to be radically disgraceful
and outrageous, in comparison to the issues that normally arise between
spouses in their daily lives; the damage has to be serious; and there has to
be a causal connection between the behavior and the damage. Here, we
may assume the abuse constitutes outrageous behavior, due to the
continuous nature of these behaviors, which include harassing the spouse
and causing ongoing suffering. The same applies to Israeli law, which
opposed the imposition of monetary sanctions for an insignificant, one-
time incident that does not reach the level of habitual abuse.
The courts would have discretion to award aggravated damages.
This is appropriate in all instances of abuse, and not merely in
extreme or particularly severe cases, because it is more than just a
punishment for the abuser; it serves as justified compensation for the
spouse who has been abused for an extended period. The ongoing
nature of these behaviors, often causing continued suffering to the
spouse, makes the tort sufficiently serious so as to justify such
damages. Finally, we would note that, regarding tort claims between
spouses for physical, sexual or emotional abuse, there should be no
difference whether the claim is brought during the marriage or
subsequent to the divorce. However, at times, the whole significance
of the claim is that it is made specifically during the marriage.
The proposed tort is accompanied by an obligation to treat the
spouse with respect, in the spirit of the principle of human dignity.
On the surface, such an obligation is merely declarative, and
therefore superfluous; however, the declarative clauses, which
constitute the basis for the tort, are also important.
Spousal abuse: (a) A person is required to treat their spouse with
respect, and avoid humiliating or degrading him/her. (b) A person
who commits an act of physical, emotional or sexual behavior that
is ongoing, degrading, harassing, upsetting or humiliating, which
interferes with the normal conduct of the spouse's life, shall have
committed an act of spousal abuse. (c) The court shall be entitled
to award, in respect of this tort, aggravated damages, even absent
proof of damage.
In this clause, the term 'spouse' shall include the person's former
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spouse and reputed spouse.
C. A Proposal for a New Offense of Spousal Abuse
We also propose establishing a similar, independent criminal
offense of spousal abuse, which will reflect a deep revulsion toward
acts of spousal abuse. This offense too will be behavioral. The
offense will bring into modern criminal law a dimension that has long
been lacking, that of physical, emotional and sexual abuse of a
spouse. It will allow for offenses of physical and sexual abuse to be
distinguished from the general offenses of assault and sexual assault,
due to the ongoing nature of the acts. It will also bring the issue of
emotional abuse before the criminal bench:
Spousal abuse: A person who commits an act of physical, emotional
or sexual behavior that is ongoing, degrading, harassing, upsetting
or humiliating, which interferes with the normal conduct of the
spouse's life, shall be liable to imprisonment for seven years.
In this clause, the term 'spouse' shall include the person's former
spouse and reputed spouse.
We also propose the adoption, subject to the modifications
indicated above, of the judicial interpretation of the majority opinion
in the Supreme Court of Israel, for the term "physical abuse," in the
context of minors and helpless persons,' which is also appropriate in
the case of sexual abuse. By changing the element of force to one of
degrading or humiliating behavior, the definition will also be
appropriate to emotional abuse.
D. Family Law. The Need for a Change in Legislative and
Judicial Policy Towards Protective Orders in Cases of
Emotional Abuse
American and Israeli legislators chose a rather successful
approach when they established a system of protective orders against
the violent individual in the home. However, the treatment of this
issue focuses on physical violence. In Israeli law, sexual violence is
given equal weight, however, this is not the case in some American
states. Emotional abuse is recognized, in Israel and in some
American states, only when it is particularly severe. In other
407. See CrimA 4596/98, supra note 120; see also the discussion accompanying
supra notes 120-33.
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American states, it does not serve as grounds for a protective order at
all. It is this that we wish to correct. It is true that, by comparison
with other types of abuse, there are difficulties in proving emotional
abuse. But these difficulties of proof should not undermine the
efforts of the law to deal appropriately with emotional abuse. As
indicated throughout this essay, this kind of abuse is at times even
more severe than other kinds of abuse. It goes on and on, and
specifically because it is difficult to identify and report, it becomes
easier for the abuser to carry out.
We therefore call on the legislatures in the various states to enact
laws that provide for emotional abuse to be a basis for protective
orders. We also call on the courts to relax the tests for granting
protective orders in the case of emotional abuse, and to recognize it
as equivalent to physical and sexual abuse. This is consistent with the
position of Jewish law, in which "no one can live with a serpent in the
same basket" - whether it is a "serpent" whose bite is physically
painful, or one whose long tongue causes emotional harm. Should
our proposal to recognize an independent tort and offense of abuse,
of whatever type, be accepted, this should emphasize the importance
of equating emotional abuse with other types for the purpose of
protective orders. To lessen the possibility of malicious use of such
orders, it would be appropriate to enact, as in Israel, provisions to
impose costs and compensation for submitting frivolous applications.
V. Conclusion
In this article we presented two models for dealing with spousal
abuse. The first common law model, as demonstrated by American and
Israeli law, is lacking in certain points. We have proposed that it be
completed in various ways, among others by the adoption of important
principles from the second model, that of Jewish law, thus obtaining a
new model that is appropriate to modern legal systems.
The new model that has been presented combines a proposal for
changes in tort and criminal law, accompanied by a recommendation
to the courts dealing with protective order in cases of domestic
violence and abuse. We proposed enacting an independent tort of
physical, sexual or emotional abuse of a spouse in addition to a
declarative-yet-legal obligation to treat the spouse with respect. We
also proposed that a similar specific criminal offense be enacted, with
a penalty of seven years imprisonment. Finally, we proposed that
laws also be enacted to allow the issue of protective orders in cases of
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emotional abuse, and to allow the courts to relax the tests for
considering such an order, since, at times, emotional abuse is equally
severe, and embitters family life even more.
In this essay we have attempted to draw attention to the
importance of a separate, specific legal attitude to spousal abuse,
because of its importance. The new model that we have proposed is
inspired by the ancient Jewish law model but differs in the important
respect that it is not contingent upon specific religious teachings or
mores for its validity. This paper offered an opportunity to see and
analyze the dialogue between an ancient, religious legal system and
its modern, secular counterparts, and the possible - perhaps
surprising - contribution of the former to the latter.
This undertaking is yet incomplete. In this essay we have
discussed the present situation and possible developments from the
perspective of tort law, criminal law, and family law. This does not
preclude other legal possibilities relating to the issue, such as suits
based on contractual grounds, under which abuse constitutes, in
effect, a kind of breach of the marriage or life union contract.
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